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Case No. 20150492-CA 
INTHE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
v. 
UENNIS TERRY WYNN, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Wynn pled guilty in 2008 to four counts of securities fraud: two 
second-degree felonies and two third-degree felonies. He appeals from the 
denial of his 2015 motions to correct a clerical error under Utah R. Crim. P. 
30(b), to correct an illegal sentence under Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e), and to 
grant relief from a final judgment under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). This Court 
has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2009 & 
Supp. 2015). 1 
INTRODUCTION 
As part of his 2008 plea agreement, Wynn agreed to pay "many times 
more" than $100,000 to his securities fraud victims. Wynn agreed that his 
1Unless otherwise stated all Utah code citations are to the current 
version. 
attorney and the prosecutor would agree to and submit the final restitution 
figure by October 6, 2008. Three weeks before that date, the prosecutor sent 
a restitution figure of about $782,000-broken down by victims-to Wynn's 
counsel, asking that counsel let him know if he objected to the figure. 
Receiving no objection, the prosecutor submitted the figure to the trial court 
on October 6, 2008. Seventeen days later, the trial court-still without 
objection from Wynn-entered a restitution order for the submitted 
amount. 
Nearly five years later, Wynn told a parole hearing officer that the 
entered $782,000 figure "sounds correct." Within a few weeks of that 
hearing, Wynn was notified that the Board of Pardons and Parole intended 
to hold him until his sentence expired, but would consider early release if 
he paid his restitution in full. 
Nearly two years after the Board's decision and six-and-a-half years 
after the trial court's restitution order, Wynn- for the first time- challenged 
the accuracy of the restitution figure and the validity of his prison sentence 
in alternative motions to correct a clerical error under rule 30(b), to correct 
an illegal sentence under rule 22(e), and for relief from judgment under rule 
60(b)(6). 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Was the final unobjected-to restitution figure a clerical mistake 
under rule 30(b), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure? 
Standard of Review. What constitutes a clerical error under rule 30(b) 
presents a question of law, reviewed for correctness. See State v. Rodrigues, 
2009 UT 62, if11, 218 P.3d 610. 
2. Was Wynn's statutory prison sentence or his final restitution order 
manifestly or patently illegal under rule 22(e)? 
Standard of Review. Whether a sentence is illegal under rule 22(e) is a 
question of law, reviewed for correctness. See State v. Vaughn, 2011 UT App 
411, if 9, 266 P.3d 202. 
3. (a) The Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA) provides "the sole 
remedy" for challenging a criminal conviction or sentence after a defendant 
has exhausted his legal remedies, including a direct appeal. 
May Wynn, who never appealed, evade the PCRA's time and 
procedural requirements by filing a rule 60(b) motion? 
(b) Alternatively, was Wynn's rule 60(b)(6) motion-filed s1x-
and-one-half years after entry of the restitution order-brought within a 
reasonable time? 
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Standard of Review. A trial court's interpretation of which law applies 
is reviewed for correctness. See Kell v. State, 2012 UT 25, ,V, 285 P.3d 1133. 
A trial court's ruling that a rule 60(b)(6) motion was not brought within a 
reasonable time is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Menzies v. 
Galetka, 2006 UT 81, ,r 63, 150 P.3d 480. 
4. Did the trial court properly deny Defendant's discovery motion 
after concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to grant relief under rules 30(b), 
22(e), and 60(b)? 
Standard of Review. This question presents a question of law, 
reviewed for correctness. See State v. Nicholls, 2006 UT 76, if 3, 148 P.3d 990. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following rules and statutes are reproduced in Addendum A: 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) 
Utah R. Crim. P. 30(b) 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) 
Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-9-101, et. seq. (Post-Conviction Remedies Act) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
17 state felony charges 
The State charged Wynn in 2006 with 19 felonies: three counts of 
second-degree felony securities fraud; three counts of third-degree felony 
securities fraud; eight counts of second-degree felony theft; two counts of 
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third-degree felony exploitation of an elder adult; two counts of third-
degree felony witness tampering; and one count of second-degree felony 
pattern of unlawful activity. Rl-2. The State dismissed the two witness 
tampering charges at preliminary hearing. R66-67. Wynn was bound over 
on the remaining 17 charges. 
Securities fraud charges. According to the probable cause affidavit, 
Wynn sold securities in a scheme to "flip" vehicles and real property. R13-
14. Wynn collected about $185,000 from at least six investors. 2 Id. Instead 
of using the money as promised, Wynn used it all for personal and 
unrelated business expenses. R14-15. 
When soliciting funds, Wynn did not tell his investors several 
material facts, such as that (1) he had filed personal bankruptcy in 1989; (2) 
his company had filed for bankruptcy in 2002; (3) he had over $2 million in 
outstanding civil judgments; (4) he had a $163,860 tax lien against his 
property; and (5) he was delinquent on principal and interest payments to a 
previous investor. R15-16. 
2The information in fact names nine securities fraud victims. Rl-10. 
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Theft charges. According to the probable cause statement, Wynn also 
collected $62,000 to buy automobiles for three victims.3 R13-14. Wynn 
neither bought the promised vehicles nor returned the money. R14. 
7 federal mail and securities fraud indictments 
and $15 million in restitution 
In 2007, a few months after the state charges were filed, Wynn was 
indicted in federal court on seven counts of mail and securities fraud. R2O8-
10. Wynn sought and received a continuance in the state case so that he 
could resolve the federal case first. R112. 
On November 1, 2007, Wynn pled guilty in federal court to a single 
count of mail fraud. R208. The federal government dropped the other 
indichnents and agreed not to seek criminal charges against Wynn for the 
acts underlying the state charges. R246-47. In his federal written plea 
statement, Wynn agreed to pay "full restitution in the aggregate amount as 
set by the Court. The government contends that the amount is 
$15,202,257.68 to the individuals identified in Exhibit 1, in the amounts 
identified in Exhibit 1." R246. This part of the written plea agreement was 
interlineated by Wynn's counsel. R246, 265. The agreement had originally 
set the $15.2 million figure as the final amount. R246, R265-66. Exhibit 1 
3The information in fact names nine theft victims, seven of w horn 
were also named as securities fraud victims. Rl-10. 
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listed 185 investors, with individual balances ranging from less than $10,000 
to over $300,000. R252-55. 
Wynn was sentenced on March 17, 2008 to 60 months in federal 
prison. R276-85. Wynn's counsel had initially sought to continue 
sentencing until the parties had reached a firm restitution figure. R276-85, 
294-97. He explained to the court that additional information about 
restitution had "been dribbling in here right up 'til last week." R278. But 
while he preferred to delay sentencing until they had a final figure, both 
Wynn's counsel and the prosecutor believed that, with more time, they 
would be able to agree on a final amount. R276-80. 
The federal court preliminarily ordered Wynn to pay $15,202,257.68 
in restitution, with the understanding that the amount could be amended by 
stipulation or, if necessary, after a hearing. R285. The parties agreed that 
Wynn could wait 60 days to surrender to federal prison so that he could 
give input on the final restitution figure. R276-85. 
Wynn's counsel obtained three continuances for Wynn to surrender, 
until October 9, 2008, so that they could finalize restitution. R303-11. 
Ultimately, the parties never amended the federal restitution order. See 
R329-30, 351. 
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Wynn agreed to pay "many times more'1 
than $100,000 in restitution for his state victims. 
In August 2008, five months after his federal sentencing, Wynn 
reached a plea agreement in his state case. R123-130, R543:2-5. He pled 
guilty to two counts of second-degree felony securities fraud and two 
counts of third-degree felony securities fraud. R123-30, R543:2-5. The State 
dismissed the remaining 13 counts. R543:2. 
The parties agreed that Wynn's state prison sentences would run 
concurrently to each other and to his five-year federal prison sentence.4 
R130. To ensure that the state prison sentence would run concurrently to 
the federal sentence, the trial court agreed to delay issuing a state 
commitment until after Wynn was scheduled to begin his federal 
commitment, on October 9, 2008. R543:3. 
Wynn's state written plea agreement advised him of the potential 
maximum prison sentences he faced: 1-to-15 years on the two second-
degree felonies and 0-to-5 years on the two third-degree felonies. R126. 
4The parties apparently obtained the trial court's approval of the plea 
and sentencing agreement in advance. See R543:2 ( counsel stating 
"sentencing as we previously discussed"); R543:3 (court stating "I indicated 
to your attorney and the State's attorney that I would accept their 
sentencing recommendations"). Rule ll(i), Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, allows parties to ask a judge in advance whether he will accept a 
proposed disposition. 
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Although Wynn was told that his state sentences would run concurrently 
with his federal sentence, no one told Wynn that he would not serve any 
prison time on the state sentences. R543:2-5. 
The parties also agreed that Wynn would pay $100,000 in restitution 
at sentencing, with a "final amount of restitution to be determined by 
[October 6, 2008] between counsel." R130. Wynn's counsel assured the 
court that he and the prosecutor would "be able to stipulate on the [final 
restitution] figure." R543:2-3. 
The trial court asked Wynn if he understood that he would be 
ordered to pay "full and complete restitution in an amount of at least 
$100,000, but probably as your attorney, I think in his words, were many 
times more than that," and that the final amount would be based on an 
agreed-upon figure to be submitted when Wynn surrendered to federal 
prison. R543:3. Wynn replied, "Yes, sir." R543:3. 
No one suggested that the restitution amount would be limited to the 
victims named in the counts that Wynn pied to or to the victims named in 
all the charged counts. R543:2-5. Wynn told the h·ial court that he had 
discussed "all the sentencing nuances" of his plea agreement with his 
attorney. R543:3-4. 
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After accepting Wynn's pleas, the trial court sentenced him to the 
agreed-upon statutory prison sentences and ordered him to pay "full and 
complete restitution," with the "stipulated amount" to be submitted by 
October 6, 2008. R543:5. 
Wynn's counsel had over 30 days to object 
to the state restitution amount., but did not. 
On October 6, 2008, the prosecutor submitted a request for a 
restitution order of $782,068.63. R134-35. He attached a list of 23 victims, 
with the amount owing to each victim. R138-40. The list included the 11 
securities fraud/ theft victims and one of the witness tampering victims 
named in the initial information. R138-40; Rl0-11. The prosecutor mailed a 
copy of the restitution request to Wynn's attorney on the day that he 
submitted it to the court. R136. 
But the submitted request also represented that the prosecutor had 
already served Wynn's counsel with the proposed restitution figure three 
weeks earlier, on September 19, 2008, with a request that counsel contact the 
prosecutor if he objected to the figure. R135. Wynn's counsel never 
contacted the prosecutor. R135. 
Nor did Wynn's counsel object to the proposed restitution order after 
it was filed with the court, even though the trial court waited 17 days to sign 
it. R141-45. 
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Five years later, Wynn told a Utah parole hearing officer that 
the state-ordered restitution figure II sounds correct. 11 
Wynn was transferred to the Utah State Prison after he completed his 
federal five-year sentence. R334-35, 355. Wynn had a parole hearing on 
May 2, 2013. R333. The hearing officer told Wynn that her records showed 
that he owed $782,068.63 in restitution, that $100,000 of that had already 
been paid, and that a balance of $682,068 remained. R339. The hearing 
officer asked if her information was correct. Id. Wynn replied, "I haven't 
seen those figures, so it sounds correct." Id. 
The hearing officer added that it looked like "there were 20 separate 
victims with losses ranging from 7,000 to $107,000 each." R340. She asked 
if Wynn wanted to add any information to that, or if that "pretty well 
sum[med] it up?" Id. Wynn said that he did not have that information in 
front of him, but agreed, "I think that sums it up." Id. 
Given the large federal and state restitution orders, the hearing officer 
expressed concern that Wynn likely would never be able to pay much 
toward his restitution obligation. R350-55. The hearing officer also told 
Wynn that the Board was crediting his time in federal custody against his 
state prison sentence. R355. 
Two weeks after the hearing, the Board issued an order setting 
Wynn's release date at the expiration of his 15-year sentences. R360. The 
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order stated that the Board would consider II an earlier release date upon 
verification of completion of all CAP programming and ... that the 
restitution owing is paid in full." Id. The order also stated that the Board's 
decision was II subject to review and modification" at "any time until actual 
release from custody." Id.; see also R361-62. 
Wynn waited another two years 
to challenge his restitution order and sentence. 
About two years later, Wynn-represented by new counsel-filed a 
motion under rule 22(e) to correct an illegal sentence. R165-70. Wynn 
asserted that his sentence and restitution order were entered in violation of 
his right to the effective assistance of counsel and due process. Id. Wynn 
claimed that his sentence and the restitution amount were 
unconstitutional- and therefore illegal- because they were both "the 
product of ineffective assistance of counsel." R174. According to Wynn, it 
was "clear" that the parties had agreed that he would not serve any time in 
state prison and that counsel should have ensured that he did not. Id. In 
support, Wynn attached a declaration from the federal prosecutor, who 
stated he believed that the state prosecutor had "planned for the state 
sentence to run concurrent with and be identical in length to the federal 
sentence." R179-80. Wynn, however, attached no declaration from the state 
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prosecutor or his prior counsel about their understanding of the plea 
agreement. R179-368. 
Wynn also asserted that his sentence was unconstitutional because 
the restitution order was "inaccurate" and his counsel had "entirely 
forfeited" his right "to an accurate determination of restitution in the state 
case." R174-75. Wynn did not suggest that the amounts assigned to each 
victim were wrong or that the prosecutor's calculations were wrong; he 
instead argued that restitution should have been lhnited to the victims 
named in the counts he pled to. R172. Wynn conceded that it was "not 
possible to determine from the restitution request and order how much 
money he owes as a result of those four counts, because the restitution 
amounts are aggregated." Id. Wynn suggested, however, that even 
accepting those aggregated amounts, he should owe at most only 
$183,116.18. Id. 
Wynn also attached his own declaration to his motion. R181-186. In 
it, he acknowledged that he had expected the restitution calculation in both 
the federal and state cases "to be a complicated task" because his businesses 
"involved multiple investors," and his bookkeeping was "poor." R181-82. 
Wynn nevertheless "counted on" his attorney to figure out restitution after 
-13-
he explained "the bookkeeping issues" to counsel and gave him what 
"limited records" Wynn had. R182. 
Wynn declared that he had never seen "the data underlying the 
restitution calculation in state court." R186. Wynn also declared that he 
had not agreed to pay more restitution than that owed to the victims of the 
counts to which he had pled and that his attorney had never discussed the 
matter with him. Id. According to Wynn, he reported to federal prison in 
October 2008, "without knowing a final restitution figure in either the 
federal or state prosecution." R184. 
After the State filed its opposition, Wynn added two alternative 
claims in his reply and in a new separate motion. First, he argued that the 
restitution amount was a clerical error that could be corrected at any time 
under rule 30(b), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. R443-44. Second, he 
argued that he was entitled to relief from the "default" restitution order 
under rule 60(b)(6). R436, 441-43. 
At the same time he added these claims, Wynn filed a motion and 
request for discovery, seeking documents related not only to his plea 
negotiations and restitution, but also for any exculpatory evidence, 
investigative reports, criminal histories for Wynn and "any government 
-14-
witnesses," and medical and mental health histories that might be in the 
prosecution's possession. R445-47. 
The State asked the trial court to delay ruling on the discovery motion 
until after it ruled on Wynn's rule 22( e ), 30(b ), and 60(b) motions. R454. 
The State pointed out that if those motions were denied, the trial court 
would lack jurisdiction to grant relief in the underlying criminal case and 
Wynn would then be required to seek relief under the Post-Conviction 
Remedies Act, where he could then seek discovery. Id. 
Trial court's ruling denying 
rule 30(b), rule 22(e), and rule 60(b) relief 
After full briefing and argument, the trial court denied all three of 
Wynn's motions. R501-09. The court denied the rule 30(b) claim because 
the $782,068.63 restitution amount was not a clerical error. R508. It denied 
the rule 22(e) motion because it concluded that an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim did not render an otherwise legal sentence illegal. R503-06. It 
denied the rule 60(b) motion because it was untimely and because, under 
Kell v. Stnte, 2012 UT 25, if 25, 285 P.3d 1133, Wynn could seek relief only 
under the PCRA. R507. 
Having concluded that Wynn was not entitled to relief under any of 
his theories, it determined that it lacked continuing jurisdiction over the 
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criminal case. RS0l, 508. It therefore denied Wynn's request to compel 
discovery. R508. 
Wynn timely appealed the trial court's ruling. R515. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Wynn's rule 30(b), rule 22(e), and rule 60(b) motions all seek to 
circumvent the time limits of the Post-Conviction Remedies Act. The trial 
court recognized and properly rejected that attempt. 
Point I. The trial court correctly rejected Wynn's claim that the final 
restitution amount was a clerical error under rule 30(b) that could be 
corrected at any time. The final restitution order bears none of the hallmarks 
of a clerical error. Wynn alleges no mathematical or recording error in the 
final ainount. Nor could he. The final restitution amount accurately 
reflected the intent of the court and the parties that Wynn pay "full and 
complete restitution," based on the "stipulated amount submitted by 
October 6th," which Wynn acknowledged would be "many times more" 
than $100,000. At bottom, Wynn's argument is that the final amount 
resulted from a legal error- that he cannot be ordered to pay restitution for 
conduct he neither pled to nor agreed to be responsible for. But that 
claimed error is judicial- not clerical- in nature and thus cannot be 
corrected" at any time" under rule 30(6). 
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Point II. The trial court also properly rejected Wynn's rule 22( e) 
claims challenging the length of his prison sentence and the final restitution 
amount. In doing so, Wynn argues no illegality in the sentences themselves. 
Again, nor could he. The trial court imposed the statutory prison terms and 
entered a restitution amount that no objected to. Wynn instead argues that 
his prison sentence and the restitution order are unconstitutional- and 
therefore illegal- because they were II imposed through ineffective 
assistance of counsel." 
Wynn's ineffective assistance challenges are not properly raised 
under rule 22(e). To fall under rule 22(e), a sentence must be "patently" or 
"manifestly" illegal. There is nothing "patently" or II manifestly" illegal 
about a statutory prison term that Wynn stipulated to or about a restitution 
order that on its face reflected what the parties had agreed to at sentencing. 
Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has expressly limited constitutional 
challenges under rule 22( e) to facial challenges. Wynn's challenge is not a 
facial challenge to his sentence, but an as-applied challenge to his counsel's 
performance. As such, it cannot be raised under rule 22(e) "at any time." 
Point III. The trial court properly denied Wynn's rule 60(b)(6) as an 
improper attempt to circumvent the PCRA and as untimely. The h·ial court 
correctly determined that it was bound to follow Kell v. State, 2012 UT 25, 
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285 P.3d 1133, which expressly held that rule 60(b) may not be used to 
circumvent the procedural and time bars of the PCRA. The trial court was 
also well within its discretion to find that six-and-one-half years after 
judgment was not a reasonable time to bring a rule 60(b)(6) motion. 
Point IV. The trial court properly denied Wynn's discovery motion 
once it concluded that the final restitution amount was not a clerical error, 
that the restitution order and prison sentences were not illegal, and that 
Wynn could not challenge his sentence under rule 60(b). At that point, the 
trial court lacked continuing jurisdiction to do anything more in the 
criminal case. 
ARGUMENT 
Wynn's motions below and his arguments on appeal are nothing 
more than a transparent attempt to skirt the statutory time limits-which 
have long since expired-for collaterally challenging his sentence. Wynn 
had, but neglected, adequate and exclusive remedies under the Post-
Conviction Re1nedies Act. But since his clailns would be barred under the 
PCRA, he has tried to shoehorn his substantive collateral challenges into 
inapplicable procedural remedies. The trial court here recognized and 
properly rejected that attempt. 
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I. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT THE 
FINAL UNOBJECTED-TO RESTITUTION FIGURE WAS 
NOT A CLERICAL MIST AKE UNDER RULE 30(B) 
Once a trial court "imposes a valid sentence" and enters a final 
judgment, it "ordinarily loses subject matter jurisdiction over the case." 
State v. Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, ,I13, 218 P.3d 610 (citing State v. Montoya, 825 
P.2d 676, 679 (Utah App. 1991)). A defendant wishing to challenge a valid 
sentence must timely appeal, see Montoya, 825 P.2d at 678-79, or timely seek 
relief under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA), see Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78B-9-101, et. seq.; Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(a). See also State v. Prion, 2012 UT 15, 
~20, 274 P.3d 919. 
A trial court, however, does have continuing jurisdiction in the 
underlying criminal case to correct a clerical error "at any time" under rule 
30(b ), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Wynn missed the deadlines to appeal his restitution order, see Utah R. 
App. 4(a) (30-day time limit for appeal), or to seek post-conviction relief, see 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-107 (one-year time limit from date cause of action 
accrued). Wynn thus invokes rule 30(b) to modify the $782,000 restitution 
figure as a mere clerical error. See Br. Aplt. 12-22. 
But the restitution order here bears none of the hallmarks of a clerical 
error. Wynn alleges no recording or mathematical error apparent on the 
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face of the record. He contends only that the trial court could not, as a 
matter of law, order him to pay restitution for conduct he neither pled to 
nor agreed to be responsible for. Br. Aplt. 14-18. But that kind of error-the 
result of judicial reasoning-is the antithesis of a clerical error. The trial 
court thus rightly concluded that the restitution amount was not a clerical 
error under rule 30(b), and that the court therefore lacked jurisdiction to 
modify it. 
A. A clerical error is a mechanical recording mistake that results 
in a judgment that does not reflect the court's actual intent. 
"Clerical 1nistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record 
and errors in the record arising from oversight or omission may be 
corrected by the court at any time .... " Utah R. Crim. P. 30(b). 
"' A clerical error is one made in recording a judgment [or order] that 
results in the entry of a judgment which does not conform to the actual 
intention of the court."' State v. Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, ,Il5, 218 P.3d 610 
( quoting Thomas A. Paulsen Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 770 P.2d 125, 130 (Utah 
1989)). A clerical mistake is "mechanical in nature," "apparent on the 
record," and "does not involve a legal decision or judgment" by the court. 
Stanger v. Sentinel Security Life Ins. Co., 669 P.2d 1201, 1206 (Utah 1983) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The goal of rule 30(b) is "to 
correct clerical errors so that the record reflects what was actually 'done or 
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intended."' Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, ,J14 (quoting Bishop v. GenTec, Inc., 2002 
UT 36, if 30, 48 P.3d 218). 
Examples of clerical errors include mathematical miscalculations-
whether by a party, clerk, judge, or jury; transcription errors in recording 
the judgment; and a judge's misstatement in pronouncing sentence. See, 
e.g., Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, ,J,J15-34 (prosecutor's miscalculation of 
restitution); Bishop, 2002 UT 36, if if 6, 32 Qury's miscalculation of damage 
award); Stanger, 669 P.2d at 1206 (prevailing party's miscalculation of 
damages); State v. Lorrah, 761 P.2d 1388, (Utah 1988) (court clerk mis-
transcribed announced by court); State v. Perkins, 2014 UT App 60, if ,I10-16, 
322 P.3d 1184 Gudge intended to impose consecutive sentences, but 
inadvertently a1mounced and entered concurrent sentences). 
A clerical error-which a court may correct at any time-is different 
fron1 a judicial error-which it may not. Thomas A. Paulson, Co., 770 P.2d at 
130. The distinction '" depends on whether [the error] was made in 
rendering the judgment [ a judicial error] or in recording the judgment as 
rendered [a clerical error]."' Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, ,I14 (quoting Bishop, 
2002 UT 36, if 32) ( emphasis added); see also Thomas A. Paulson, Co., 707 P.2d 
at 130. Unlike a clerical error, which results in a judgment that II does not 
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conform to the actual intention of the court," a judicial error in rendering 
the judgment "results in a substantively incorrect judgment." Id. 
In assessing whether an error is clerical as opposed to judicial, Utah 
courts have generally focused on three things: "(1) whether the order or 
judgment that was rendered reflects what was done or intended, (2) 
whether the error is the result of judicial reasoning and decision making, 
and (3) whether the error is clear from the record." Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, 
if14. 
B. The restitution amount was not a recording mistake and its 
entry reflected the actual intent of the court. 
Under the foregoing standard, nothing about the restitution order 
here looks like a clerical error. Wynn does not allege a mathematical or 
recording error. Br. Aplt. 15-22. He instead alleges that the restitution 
amount is the result of a legal error- that he cannot be ordered to pay 
restitution for conduct he neither pied to nor agreed to be responsible for. 
Br. Aplt. 16-17. That claimed error is judicial-not clerical-in nature. 
1. The restitution order reflected the intent of the court and 
parties that Wynn pay "many times more" than $100,000. 
First, as the trial court found, the order "reflects what was done or 
intended." Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, if 14. As a tenn of his plea agreement, 
Wynn agreed to pay restitution in an amount "to be detennined by Oct. 6, 
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08 between counsel." R130; see also R543:3. Wynn said he understood that 
his final restitution would be "many times more" than the $100,000 he paid 
at sentencing. R543:3. The trial court expressed its intent to order II full and 
complete restitution," based on the II stipulated amount submitted by 
October 6th." R543:5. The trial court fulfilled its expressed intent-and that 
of the parties-when it signed the final restitution order submitted by the 
prosecutor. 
Wynn asserts that the record cannot "properly" be "read as indicating 
that [the trial court] intended to enter an order for restitution beyond 
anything that Wynn agreed to." Br. Aplt. 15. Wynn argues that Utah law 
11 allows for criminal restitution only for damages from offenses of 
conviction unless there is an agreement by the defendant to pay restitution 
beyond the offenses of conviction." Br. Aplt. 16. According to Wynn, he 
11 did not agree to pay restitution to people other than the victims of the 
counts pied to." Br. Aplt. 17. In support, Wynn cites only his long-after-
the-fact declaration, which he attached to his motion to set aside the 
restitution order. Id. 
Wynn does not properly read the record. The only agreement on the 
record was that Wynn would pay restitution in an amount to be determined 
by counsel, and that the amount would likely be "many times more" than 
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$100,000. R130; R543:3-5. No one, including Wynn, ever suggested that the 
final amount would be limited to the victims named in the counts pled to or 
charged. R543:3-5. Rather, the parties clearly expressed that the final 
restitution would be based on counsel's future agreement. 
Indeed, Wynn's argument is at odds with his own expressed 
anticipation that the final amount would be "many times more" than 
$100,000. Wynn now asserts that he owed only $138,116.18 to the victims 
named in the counts pled to and a total of $184,526 if the victims in all the 
charged counts are included. Br. Aplt. 27. Neither of those figures is "many 
times 1nore" than $100,000; they are not even one times more. The final 
$782,000 figure, however, is "many times" more. 5 
Wynn's claim that he did not agree to the final restitution amount is 
also at odds with what he told the parole hearing officer, five years later. 
When the hearing officer asked him about the accuracy of the $782,000 
restitution order, Wynn said that it "sounds correct." R339. And when the 
5Wynn's calculations of what he would owe to victims named in the 
case are incorrect. He bases his calculations on the figures alleged in the 
infonnation. The information, however, did not purport to set out final and 
accurate restitution figures. Under the updated figures attached to the final 
restitution order, Wynn owes $266,526.18 if all the fraud and theft victims 
named in the information are included; he owes an additional $50,000 if the 
named victim from the dismissed witness tampering count is included. See 
R144-45. 
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hearing officer said that 20 victims were listed, "with losses ranging from 
7,000 to $107,000 each," Wynn said, "I think that sums it up." R340. 
Wynn's lack of surprise at and his ratification of the $782,000 figure support 
the conclusion that Wynn agreed to the restitution amount as ordered. 
Counsel's silence when the restitution order was submitted does not 
change that conclusion. If anything, counsel's silence - on this record -
affirmatively supports it. First, absent contrary evidence, this Court must 
presume that counsel reasonably chose not to object because the proposed 
restitution was accurate and Wynn had agreed to pay it as part of his plea 
agreement. See Burt v. Titl01L1, 134 S.Ct. 10, 17 (2013) (" absence of evidence 
cannot overcome the 'strong presumption that counsel's conduct [fell] 
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance"') ( quoting 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984)). Wynn offered nothing 
below-such as his counsel's declaration-to support his assumption that 
counsel's silence was due to negligence instead of a conscious decision. See 
Fairchild v. Workman, 279 F.3d 1134, (10th Cir. 2009) ("Only in the most 
exceptional circumstances will we issue the writ without allowing counsel 
an opportunity to explain his conduct."). 
Second, everything in this record supports the conclusion that 
counsel did not object to the restitution amount because Wynn had agreed 
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to it. The record shows that Wynn's counsel was on top of the restitution 
issue from the beginning. Counsel diligently sought to reach stipulated 
restitution amounts in both the federal and state prosecutions. He raised 
the issue at both sentencings and rather than blindly agreeing to the 
amounts, sought more time to review restitution. See, e.g., Rl 12, 130, 246-67, 
265, 276-85, 303-11; R543:2-3. Indeed, counsel tried to continue the federal 
sentencing and thrice continued Wynn's surrender date solely for 
purpose of resolving restitution with Wynn's input. R276-85, 303-11. 
the 
All 
this belies Wynn's unsupported claim now that his counsel negligently 
allowed the final state restitution order to be entered without Wynn's input 
or approval. 
In sum, all the record evidence shows that the final restitution order 
reflected not only the court's intent, but also Wynn's intent. 
2. The restitution figure resulted from judicial reasoning 
and decision making, not from a mathematical or 
transcription error. 
As stated, Wynn does not claim that the final restitution amount 
stemmed from miscalculation. He instead asserts a legal claim: that the 
final amount unlawfully included victims and amounts that he had not 
agreed to reimburse. Br. Aplt. 16-17. Recognizing and resolving a legal 
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Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, ,I25-27. And erroneously deciding a legal claim 
results in a substantive-or judicial-error, not a clerical one. See id. at if 14. 
Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court has held that a trial court engages in 
judicial reasoning just by setting restitution-even when it is agreed upon-
and accepting the figures presented by a party. Id. at if if 25-27. In Rodrigues, 
a criminal non-support prosecution, the parties agreed that the defendant 
would pay child support arrearages from a certain date through the 
sentencing date. Id. at if 26. The trial court accepted the arrearage figures as 
presented by the State, which turned out to have been miscalculated in 
Rodrigues' s favor. Id. 
The Rodrigues court held that the trial court's "determination of 
restitution" and its acceptance of "the figures presented by the State," 
required "judicial reasoning and decision making." Id. at if25-27. This is 
because a trial court "has discretion to adjust the amount of restitution 
agreed to by the parties in a plea agreement." 6 Id. at if26. Rodrigues 
nevertheless held that the erroneous restitution amount was a clerical error 
6Rodrigues adds the caveat that "any adjustment must fall within the 
'conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of 
[the] plea agreement."' Id. at if 26 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4)(a) 
(2008)) (brackets in Rodrigues). The h·ial court here made no adjustment to 
the submitted restitution amount, but if it had, that too would have resulted 
from judicial decision-making. 
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because, based on the State's miscalculation, the court had "erroneously 
entered an amount of restitution that did not conform to its judicial 
determination." Id. at ,I26. In other words, the clerical error in Rodrigues 
resulted not from the court's judicial reasoning, but from the State's 
mathematical miscalculation. Id. at ,I27. 
Here, like in Rodrigues, the trial court engaged in judicial reasoning 
when it decided to accept the parties' restitution agreement and to adopt the 
final unobjected-to restitution order as submitted by the State. But, unlike 
in Rodrigues, no one here has claimed that the submitted amount was based 
on a mathematical miscalculation. Rather, as stated, Wynn argues only that 
the trial court could not legally order him to pay restitution beyond that to 
which he had agreed. Br. Aplt. 16-17. 
Wynn also argues that it is "clear that the restitution order is not the 
product of determination by counsel but was instead a default order," 
which required him to pay restitution for conduct he had not agreed to. Br. 
Aplt. 19. But while the parties' intent "may be taken into account in the 
clerical error analysis," ultimately, it is "the intent of the court or fact finder 
that is binding." Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, ,IlS (emphasis added). As stated, 
the clear intent of the trial court here was to enter the restitution amount 
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that the parties agreed to. The trial court carried out that intent when it 
signed the final order. 
And, as explained, the trial court here had every reason to believe 
that the final restitution order was "the product of determination by 
counsel," as opposed to a default order. Counsel represented to the trial 
court that by October 6th, he would reach a final restitution figure with the 
prosecutor that would be "many times more" than $100,000; the prosecutor 
submitted a final restitution figure that fit that bill by the promised date; 
and counsel never objected to the final figure, even though it had been 
served on him more than a month before the trial court signed it. 
In sum, the trial court's entry of the final restitution order was based 
on judicial reasoning and decision making and was therefore not a clerical 
error. 
3. No error is clear from the record. 
Wynn argues that "the erroneous nature" of the restitution order "is 
clear from the record, for it does not reflect the agreement of Wynn, one of 
the two parties who should have been in agreement before the court signed 
the order." Br. Aplt. 20. Thus, in Wynn's view, his own lack of explicit 
approval of the figures equate to explicit contradiction of the prosecution's 
figures. 
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But, again, the only agreement "clear from the record" is that Wynn 
agreed to pay full restitution in an amount to be determined by his counsel 
and the prosecutor and that everyone anticipated that the final amount 
would be "many times more" than $100,000. Nothing was said about 
limiting the final amount to victims named in the counts pled to or charged. 
And the final order fell squarely within what the parties had represented to 
the trial court. And counsel-who had more than a month to do so-never 
objected to the proposed order. Given the prosecutor's request for input 
from counsel, the court could justifiably rely on counsel's silence as 
indicating his assent to the prosecutor's figures. And Wynn's later 
ratification of the final restitution a1nount gives after-the-fact confirmation 
that it was not in error. 
In sum, nothing in the record suggests any error in the final 
restitution amount, let alone a clerical one. The trial court thus properly 
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concluded that the final restitution amount was not a clerical error under 
rule 30(b) and that the court therefore lacked jurisdiction to modify it. 7 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT THE 
STATUTORY PRISON SENTENCE AND THE FINAL 
RESTITUTION AMOUNT WERE NOT PATENTLY OR 
MANIFESTLY ILLEGAL UNDER RULE 22(E) 
A trial court also retains continuing jurisdiction to "correct an illegal 
sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time." Utah R. 
Crim. P. 22(e). But rule 22(e) does not confer continuing jurisdiction on a 
trial court to entertain collateral attacks on a plea, conviction, or valid 
sentence. See State v. Nicholls, 2006 UT 76, ~4, 148 P.3d 990; State v. Brooks, 
908 P.2d 856, 860 (Utah 1995); Montoya, 825 P.2d at 279. A defendant must 
pursue those attacks through a timely petition under the PCRA. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 78B-9-102(1) (stating that PCRA "establishes the sole remedy 
for any person who challenges a conviction or sentence for a criminal 
7Wynn also asserts that the final restitution order is "clearly 
erroneous because it does not account for or give [him] credit for the 
$100,000 in restitution he had paid at the time he pied and was sentenced." 
Br. Aplt. 20. But the order correctly sets out "the amount of full restitution" 
that Wynn had agreed to pay. R141. Wynn's $100,000 payment does not 
make that final figure incorrect; it merely reduces how much he still owes. 
And it appears that both the Board and the trial court have credited that 
payment against the final restitution amount. See R502 (trial court's ruling 
noting that final restitution figure included the $100,000 plus an additional 
$682,068); R339-40 (parole hearing officer noting that Wynn owes 
$682,086.63 in restitution). 
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offense and who has exhausted all other legal remedies, including a direct 
appeal"); Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(a) ("The [PCRA] sets forth the manner and 
extent to which a person may challenge the legality of a criminal conviction 
and sentence after the conviction and sentence have been affirmed in a 
direct appeal ... or the time to file such an appeal has expired."). To be 
timely; Wynn had to file his collateral attack on the judgment within one 
year after his time to appeal expired. Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-9-107(2)(a). 
Again, having missed the deadline to appeal or file a post-conviction 
petition, Wynn argues that his statutory prison sentence and restitution 
order were illegal within the meaning of rule 22(e). Br. Aplt. 22-34. Wynn 
asserts that his prison sentence and restitution order are unconstitutional-
and therefore illegal- because they were II imposed through ineffective 
assistance of counsel." Br. Aplt. 23-24. Regarding his prison sentence, 
Wynn contends that it is II clear that the parties agreed" he "would serve no 
time in the Utah State Prison as a result of his pleas in the state case," and 
that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective for not ensuring that this 
agreement was carried out. Br. Aplt. 27-28. Regarding the restitution order, 
Wynn contends that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective for 
defaulting on the final restitution order because Wy1m had never agreed "to 
pay restitution for anything beyond the counts he pled to." Br. Aplt. 26. 
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Wynn's allegations are not properly raised under rule 22(e). To fall 
within rule 22(e), a sentence must be ''patently" or "manifestly" illegal. 
State v. Candedo, 2010 UT 32, ~9, 232 P.3d 1008. There is nothing "patently" 
or "manifestly" illegal about a statutory prison term that Wynn stipulated 
to or about a restitution order that on its face reflected what the parties had 
agreed to at sentencing. 
And a claim that counsel was ineffective during the plea and 
sentencing process does not render a facially valid sentence illegal within 
the meaning of rule 22(e). Indeed, such a claim goes not to whether the 
sentence is illegal, but to whether it was erroneous. The trial court thus 
properly ruled that it did not have jurisdiction over Wynn's claims under 
rule 22(e). 
A. Rule 22(e) applies only to patently or manifestly illegal 
sentences. 
Because rule 22(e) allows a court to review an illegal sentence at any 
time, the Utah Supreme Court has "narrowly circumscribed" its reach "to 
prevent abuse." State v. Telford, 2002 UT 51, ,IS, 48 P.3d 228. The concern is 
that a broad construction of the rule would "sanction a fact-intensive 
challenge to the legality of a sentencing proceeding asserted long after the 
time for raising it in the initial h·ial or direct appeal." State v. Prion, 2012 UT 
15, if 20. "A parallel challenge to the proceeding leading to a defendant's 
-33-
conviction, after all, would be time-barred, see generally Post-Conviction 
Remedies Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-9-106,-107, and it would make little 
sense to elevate challenges to sentencing proceedings over parallel 
challenges to the guilt phase of a trial." Id. 
Rule 22(e), therefore, has been limited to "patently or manifestly" 
illegal sentences. Candedo, 2010 UT 32, ,I9. A "patently or manifestly" 
illegal sentence is one that is '" ambiguous with respect to the time and 
manner in which it is to be served, is internally contradictory, omits a term 
required to be imposed by statute, is uncertain as to the substance of the 
sentence, or is a sentence which the judg1nent of conviction did not 
authorize."' Id. at ,f 12 (quoting State v. Yazzie, 2009 UT 14, ,I13, 203 P.3d 
984)). Typically, such a sentence occurs when "the sentencing court has no 
jurisdiction" or "when the sentence is beyond the authorized statutory 
range. State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, if 15, 84 P.3d 854. 
A sentence may also be illegal under rule 22(e) if it is 
unconstitutional. Candedo, 2010 UT 32, ,Ill; Prion, 2012 UT 15, ,I,I21-24; 
State v. Houston, 2015 UT 40, iliI20-26. Even so, not all constitutional attacks 
on a sentence may be brought under rule 22(e). Houston, 2015 UT 40, 'if 21; 
Prion, 2012 UT 15, if21. Rather, the Utah Supreme Court has limited such 
attacks to "facial constitutional challenges to the sentence that do not 
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implicate a fact-intensive analysis." Houston, 2015 UT 40, if 18. In other 
words, the constitutional challenge must "attack the sentence itself and not 
the underlying conviction," and it must "do so as a facial challenge rather 
than an as-applied inquiry." Houston, 2015 UT 40, if26 (emphasis added). 
The reason for Houston's limitation is to prevent the abuse that may come 
from being able to challenge an illegal sentence at any time. Id. at if 23. 
Houston gave several examples of facial challenges that could be 
appropriately brought under rule 22(e), such as a challenge to the 
indeterminate sentencing scheme under Utah's separation of powers clause; 
a claim that the sentence violated the cruel and unusual punishment clauses 
of the federal and state constitutions, "but only to the extent that the 
defendant argue[s] for 'a per se violation'"; or a claim that the sentence 
violated double jeopardy. Id. at if ,I24, 26 (citing Telford, 2002 UT 51, if if3-7; 
Prion, 2012 UT 15, ,r ,r 23-24). Those challenges attack Ill facial defects"' that 
can '"easily be corrected without the need for factual development in the 
original trial court."' Id. at if 24. 
Houston also cited an example of an inappropriate rule 22(e) 
constitutional challenge: "claims brought under the Sixth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution and article I, section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution," because "those clauses [do] not relate to sentencing." Id. at 
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if26 (citing Telford, 2002 UT 51, if 6). Other examples, of course, include u as-
applied" constitutional challenges because they, unlike facial challenges, 
require the court to "delve into the record or make findings of fact." Id. at 
if 26, 27. 
B. The statutory prison sentences and restitution order are not 
patently or manifestly illegal. 
The trial court here rightly concluded that Wynn's statutory prison 
sentence and restitution order are not patently or manifestly illegal. Indeed, 
both are facially valid. 
1. Prison sentence challenge. 
As a threshold matter, Wynn argues no illegality in the sentences 
themselves. Br. Aplt. 22-33. Nor could he. The trial court imposed the 
prison terms permitted by statute: 1-to-15 years on the second-degree 
felonies and 0-to-5 years on the third-degree felonies. And Wynn expressly 
agreed to those statutory prison terms. R126, 130; R543:2-5. The trial court 
also exercised its discretion to run the sentences concurrently to each other 
and to the federal sentence, as the parties requested. R543:2-5; R130. Thus, 
Wynn's prison sentences are facially valid. 
Wynn instead argues that his prison sentence is illegal because the 
parties' plea agreement conten1plated that he "would serve no time in the 
Utah State Prison as a result of his pleas in the state case," and his counsel 
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was ineffective for not ensuring that this intent was carried out by asking 
the court to impose probation instead of prison or by seeking a reduction of 
the second-degree felonies under Utah Code Ann. section 76-3-402. Br. 
Aplt. 27-28. Wynn reasons that his counsel's ineffectiveness rendered his 
facially-valid prison sentence unconstitutional and therefore illegal under 
rule 22(e). Id. at 23-25. 
Wynn's "constitutional" challenge to his prison sentence is precisely 
the kind of challenge that Houston forbids. First, it is not a facial challenge 
to his sentence or to the statute under which he was sentenced. It is instead 
an as-applied challenge to his counsel's constitutional performance in 
procuring the facially-valid sentence. Such a claim is not a purely legal one 
that a court can resolve without further factual development. Rather, 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims are mixed questions of law and fact. 
See, e.g., State v. Hutchings, 2012 UT 50, if 8, 285 P.3d 1183. As such, they do 
not attack "facial defects" that can "easily be corrected without the need for 
factual development in the original trial court." Prion, 2012 UT 15, ,124. 
Ineffective assistance of counsel challenges to a sentence, therefore, could 
never be the kind of constitutional challenges allowed under rule 22( e ), and 
Utah courts have never resorted to rule 22(e) to remedy a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
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Indeed, allowing an ineffective assistance challenge to a sentence u at 
any time" would invite the very abuse that Houston sought to prevent. A 
defendant could potentially turn every facially legal sentence into a 
"patently or manifestly" illegal one merely by alleging that his counsel was 
unconstitutionally ineffective during the sentencing process. Cf State v. 
Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, iJ13, 167 P.3d 1046 ("Asa practical matter, there is no 
alleged flaw in a guilty plea of a defendant represented by counsel that 
could not be attributed in some way to deficient representation."). If that 
were the rule, rule 22( e) would effectively have no limits. 
Wynn's challenge to his sentence is improperly brought under rule 
22(e) for another reason. Although he denies it, see Br. Aplt. 23, Wynn's 
challenge ultimately goes to the validity of his plea, not to the legality of his 
sentence. Wynn essentially asserts that he agreed to plead guilty on the 
understanding that any prison time served on state convictions would not 
exceed the five years imposed on his federal convictions. See Br. Aplt. 27. 
That, at best, alleges only a misunderstanding of the plea terms. It does not 
allege an error in the sentences that the trial court can correct. 
"Although sentencing is a judicial function, under Utah's 
indeterminate sentencing scheme, the Board fixes the number of years to be 
served and grants parole within its sole discretion." State v. Thurman, 2014 
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UT App 119, if4 n.3. See also Kelly v. Bard of Pardons, 2012 UT App 279, ,I,13-
4, 288 P.3d 39, 41 (Board has non-reviewable constitutional authority to 
determine if and when a prison may be granted parole). Thus, the trial 
court here could limit Wynn's prison term to five years only by converting 
the second-degree pleas into third-degree pleas. But that would require a 
change to the pleas. And a defendant may not challenge his pleas under 
rule 22(e). See Nicholls, 2006 UT 76, if 4; Brooks, 908 P.2d at 860. 
In sum, Wynn's challenge to his prison sentence is improper under 
rule 22(e). 8 
8In any event, Wynn could not overcome Strickland's strong 
presumption that his counsel's performance was objectively reasonable or 
that any deficient performance did not prejudice him. See Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 690. Nothing in the record supports Wynn's claim that the parties 
and the court all intended that he would serve no time on his state 
convictions. This Court may not rely on the absence of record evidence to 
find counsel ineffective. See Burt v. Titlow, 134 S.Ct. 10, 17 (2013). But the 
record shows the opposite, anyway. Wynn knowingly pled to two second-
degree felonies with statutory prison terms of 1 to 15 years. Wynn was thus 
on notice that even if his sentences ran concurrently with his five-year 
federal sentence, he potentially faced an additional 10 years in state prison. 
If, as Wynn claims, the parties had all truly intended that he serve no prison 
time on his state sentences, they could have ensured that intent by allowing 
hiin to plead guilty only to third-degree felonies. Yet they did not. And 
while Wynn faults his counsel for not seeking other solutions- such as 
asking for probation or a 402 reduction, Br. Aplt. 27-28-he proffers no facts 
or authority that counsel have unilaterally achieved those results without 
the prosecutor's agreement. Telling, Wynn offered no declaration from the 
state prosecutor or his counsel that such an agreement was even possible. 
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2. Restitution amount challenge. 
Wynn's rule 22(e) challenge to the restitution order suffers from the 
same flaws as his prison sentence and rule 30(b) challenges. Wynn argues 
that his sentence is "unconstitutional because the restitution ordered is 
inaccurate, and trial counsel was ineffective in entirely forfeiting Wynn's 
right to an accurate determination of restitution in the state case." Br. Aplt. 
25. 
As explained, Wy1m's "constitutional" challenge is not a proper one 
under rule 22(e) because it does not involve a facial challenge to the 
restitution award. Rather, Wynn presents a fact-intensive challenge to his 
counsel's 01nission of an objection to the final restitution order. 
In sum, Wynn has not shown that the final restitution order was 
illegal under rule 22( e). 9 
9Wy1m also could not prevail on an ineffective assistance claiin 
regarding his restitution. First, as explained in Point I, Wynn has not shown 
that the final restitution is inaccurate, let alone that counsel was ineffective 
for not objecting to it. Second, Wynn proffered nothing below to prove that 
his counsel performed objectively unreasonably when he did not object to 
the final restitution order. Absent any contrary evidence, this Court must 
presume counsel's effectiveness. See Burt, 134 S.Ct. at 17. And, as explain in 
Point I, everything in this record supports that presumption. 
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III. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED WYNN'S RULE 
60(B)(6) MOTION BOTH AS UNTIMELY AND AS AN 
IMPROPER ATTEMPT TO CIRCUMVENT THE PCRA 
Wynn alternatively sought to have his restitution order set aside 
under rule 60(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Wynn argues that the 
trial court erred in deciding that his rule 60(b)(6) motion was untimely and 
an improper bid to circumvent the requirements of the PCRA. Br. Aplt. 34-
44. 
A. The trial court properly denied the rule 60(b) motion as an 
improper attempt to circumvent the PCRA. 
The trial court relied on Kell v. State to conclude that Wynn could not 
use rule 60(b) to challenge the final restitution amount. R506-08. The Utah 
Supreme Court held in Kell that a rule 60(b) motion may not be brought in 
an attempt to evade the requirements of the PCRA. Kell v. State, 2012 UT 15, 
,125-30, 285 P.3d 1133. Thus, when the PCRA is in direct conflict with rule 
60(b), the movant must proceed under the PCRA. Id. 
The PCRA "establishes the sole remedy for any person who challenges 
a conviction or sentence for a criminal offense and who has exhausted all 
other legal remedies including a direct appeal .... " Utah Code Ann. § 78B-
9-102(1). The PCRA replaced "all prior remedies for review, including 
extraordinary or common law writs." Id. 
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The Utah Supreme Court, through its rulemaking authority, has 
mandated that Utah courts must apply the PCRA to the exclusion of all 
other remedies for collaterally attacking a criminal judgment. Utah R. Civ. 
P. 65C(a) (stating that the PCRA "sets forth the manner and extent to which 
a person may challenge the legality of a criminal conviction and sentence 
after the conviction and sentence have been affirmed in a direct appeal ... 
or the time to file such an appeal has expired"). 
And the supreme court has followed that mandate consistently. The 
Kell court, for example, held that "rule 60(b) may not circumvent conflicting 
statutory mandates if a statute occupies the field that would otherwise be 
controlled by rule 60(b)." Kell, 2012 UT 25, if28. Thus, while rule 60(b) 
"might be an appropriate avenue when the motion does not attempt to 
achieve relief that the PCRA would bar," rule 60(b) cannot act "as a 
substitute for a prohibited postconviction petition." Id. 
The PCRA "occupies the field" in which Wynn seeks relief. Wynn's 
rule 60(b) motion sought relief from the restitution part of his sentence 
based on a claim that its enh·y resulted from his counsel's alleged 
ineffectiveness. R441-42. As stated, the PCRA is "the sole remedy" for a 
person to challenge a "sentence for a criminal offense" after he "has 
exhausted all other legal remedies, including a direct appeal." Utah Code 
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Ann.§ 78B-9-102(1). And the PCRA gives petitioners an express remedy for 
a sentence that resulted from ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. § 78B-9-
104(1)(a), (d). Because Wynn did not timely appeal his sentence, he had to 
pursue his challenge to that sentence under the PCRA and be subject to any 
time or procedural bars. See Id. § 78B-9-106, -107. 
Wynn contends that he is "not trying to circumvent the PCRA." Br. 
Aplt. 41. "Rather," he asserts, "he is trying to obtain relief from a default 
judgment that entered through ineffective assistance of trial counsel." Id. 
But that is precisely the kind of claim that the PCRA covers. Id. § 78B-9-
104 ( 1) (a), ( d). 
Wynn suggests that Kell's holding does not apply to him because the 
State "has never contended the PCRA would bar [his] claims for relief." Br. 
Aplt. 41. The State, however, cannot be expected to raise time and 
procedural bars under the PCRA when Wynn has yet to file a PCRA 
petition. And it is very likely that Wynn's challenge to his sentence six-and-
a-half years after the fact would be foreclosed by the PCRA' s one-year 
limitations period and its procedural default provisions. See Utah Code 
Ann.§ 78B-9-107 (petitioner has one year after "cause of action has accrued" 
to file petition); id. § 78B-9-106 (setting out procedural bars). 
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In sum, the trial court correctly concluded that Wynn's rule 60(b) 
motion was an improper attempt to evade the requirements of the PCRA. 10 
B. The trial court also properly found that six-and-one-half years 
after judgment was not a reasonable time to bring a rule 
60(b) ( 6) motion. 
Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, allows a trial court, "in the 
furtherance of justice," and "upon such terms as are just," to "relieve a party 
... from a final judgment" for five specified reasons, including (1) excusable 
neglect, (2) newly discovered evidence, (3) fraud, (4) a void judgment, (5) a 
satisfied judgment, or (6) "any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). Wynn brought his 
motion under subsection (6). 11 R440-44. A motion under the first three 
subsections (excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, and fraud) must 
be brought within three months after the judgment was entered. Id. A 
I0The trial court also questioned whether it was even proper to file a 
rule 60(b) motion in a criminal case. R506 n.2. The trial court noted that Kell 
and the other cases cited below all dealt with rule 60(b) motions in PCRA 
actions, "which are civil in nature." Id. (emphasis added) (citing Kell, 2012 
UT 253; Menzies, 2006 UT 81; Honie v. State, 2014 UT 19, 342 P.3d 182). The 
trial court acknowledged that civil procedural rules "may apply in criminal 
cases 'where there is no other applicable statute or rule."' R506 n.2 (quoting 
Utah R. Civ. P. 81(e)). But here it appeared that "both Rule 22(e)," and the 
"PCRA" were "applicable to address [Wynn's] allegations." R506 n.2. The 
trial court ultimately did not answer that question because it resolved the 
case under Kell. 
II Below, Wynn also alleged that subsection (1), excusable neglect, 
applied, but he withdrew that argument in his reply memorandum. R479. 
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motion under the remaining subsections must be made "within a reasonable 
time." Id. 
That standard requires a party to have" acted diligently once the basis 
for the relief became available, and that the delay in seeking relief did not 
cause undue hardship to the opposing party." Crane-Jenkins v. Mikarose, 
LLC, 2015 UT App 270, if12, 799 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (quotation marks and 
citation omitted). What constitutes a reasonable time under rule 60(b)(6) 
will depend on '" the facts of each case, considering such factors as the 
interest in finality, the reason for the delay, the practical ability of the 
litigant to learn earlier of the grounds relied upon, and prejudice to the 
other parties."' Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, ~65, 150 P.3d 480 (quoting 
Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431,435 (Utah 1993)). 
The trial court here found that Wynn did "not appear to have acted 
diligently" in pursuing a "possible relief from judgment." R507. The 
record-and even Wynn's own declaration-supported that finding. The 
restitution order was entered on October 6, 2008. Wynn filed his 60(b) 
motion in March 2015, almost six-and-one-half years later. Wynn asserted 
that he first learned about the final restitution amount at his May 2013 
parole hearing. R184-186; R544:5. But he did not explain why he could not 
have learned of the restitution order before then. Indeed, his statement at 
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the parole hearing that the restitution amount "sounds correct," suggested 
that he did in fact know of it earlier. More importantly, even assuming that 
he did not, and could not with reasonable diligence, learn of the order 
sooner, he never explained why he waited for nearly another two years to 
file his 60(b) motion. That was reason alone for the h·ial court to find that 
the motion was not filed within a "reasonable time." See Crane-Jenkins, 2015 
UT App 270, ,I12 (rule 60(b )' s "reasonable time" standard requires movant 
to act" diligently once the basis for the relief became available"). 
Wynn argues that the reason for his delay was that "no one 
provided" him "with a copy of the default restitution order or advised him 
as to its illegal nature until present counsel went to dish·ict court and copied 
the order and mailed it" to him "in December of 2014." Br. Aplt. 38. But 
Wynn admits that he learned of the final restitution order and amount at the 
parole hearing more than 18 months before then. He does not explain why 
he could not have, with reasonable diligence, procured a copy of the order 
sooner. Even after obtaining the copy, he waited another three months to 
file his 60(b) motion. And he cannot pin the reasonableness of his own 
diligence on his current counsel later telling him that the order was illegal. 
Cf Brown v. State, 2015 UT App 254, iliJ9-10, 361 P.3d 124 (holding under 
PCRA statute of limitations that "reasonable diligence" does not depend on 
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when petitioner "recognizes" the "legal significance" of known facts) 
(quotations and citations omitted). Even if he could, he does not show that 
it was reasonable to wait so long to obtain that advice. 
Wynn also faults the trial court for not expressly addressing the 
"interest in finality" and "prejudice to the other parties" factors, which he 
says should be resolved in his favor. 12 Br. Aplt. 37-40. As explained, 
however, rule 60(b)'s "reasonable time" standard requires that the movant 
act" diligently once the basis for the relief became available." Crane-Jenkins, 
2015 UT App 270, ~12. Once the trial court found that Wynn had not acted 
diligently in pursuing rule 60(b) relief, it did not have to consider other 
factors to conclude that his motion was not filed within a reasonable time. 
And Wy1m is wrong that the State has no interest in the finality of his 
restitution order or that it would not be prejudiced by the order being set 
aside six-and-one-half years after its entry. The State entered into a plea 
agreement with Wynn in which it dismissed 13 felony counts in exchange 
for his pleas to four counts and an agree1nent to pay full restitution, which 
12Wynn also complains that the trial court did not consider the factors 
of "reason for delay" and "practical ability to learn of grounds earlier." Br. 
Aplt. 36-39. The trial court's discussion of Wynn's lack of diligence, 
however, addressed those factors and resolved them against him. See R507 
(noting that Wynn gave no reasons or rationale for his delay in learning of 
the restitution order and filing his rule 60(b) motion). 
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as Wynn acknowledged at his plea hearing, would be "many times more" 
than $100,000. 
Setting aside the final restitution order would remove a material term 
of the plea agreement and permanently deprive the State of the benefit of its 
bargain. And doing so would oblige the State to reinvestigate and re-prove 
the victims' complicated losses using stale evidence many years removed. 
Under these circumstances, a defendant could be confident that the 
provable amount would be lower for no other reason that document 
spoilage. Granting Wynn's requested relief would incentivize defendants to 
lull the victims and prosecution into a false sense of finality by tacitly 
approving the restitution order, only to cray foul after enough time has 
passed that the evidence will no longer support the award. That kind of 
gamesmanship is the precise evil that rule 60(b)'s reasonable diligence 
requirement bars. 
Wynn asserts that the State's interest in the finality of the restitution 
order is not served so long as he is in prison and unable to work toward 
paying his restitution. Br. Aplt. 38-40. Wynn is right that the State has an 
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interest in having Wynn pay his agreed-upon restitution. But setting aside 
or reducing his restitution order would thwart, not serve, that interest. 13 
In sum, the trial court was well within its discretion in deciding that 
Wynn's rule 60(b)(6) motion was not brought within a reasonable time. 
IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED WYNN'S 
DISCOVERY MOTION AFTER IT DETERMINED THAT IT 
LACKED JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER HIS 
CHALLENGES TO HIS SENTENCE 
Wynn finally argues that the trial court erred in denying his discovery 
motion on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction to do so. Br. Aplt. 45-46. 
Wynn reasons that because the trial court had jurisdiction "to consider its 
own jurisdiction," it necessarily had jurisdiction to order discovery. Br. 
Aplt. 44 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
13Wynn also asserts that the State would not be prejudiced by rule 
60(b) relief because "the State's interest is for its prosecutors to integriously 
[sic] honor both the letter and the spirit of the plea agreement." Br. Aplt. at 
40. The State is well aware of its professional and ethical obligations to 
honor its plea agreements and it takes those obligations seriously. The State 
disputes, however, Wynn's take on "the letter and the spirit of the plea 
agreement." As explained, the only agreement on the record is that Wynn 
agreed to pay full restitution in an amount to be agreed upon by the 
attorneys and that he anticipated that the amount would be "many times 
more" than $100,000. There is nothing dishonest or unethical about wanting 
to hold a criminal defendant to the letter and spirit of his agreement with 
the State. 
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But once the trial court concluded that the final restitution amount 
was not a clerical error, that the restitution order and prison sentences were 
not illegal, and that Wynn could not challenge his sentence under rule 60(b), 
the trial correctly determined that it lacked continuing jurisdiction to do 
anything in the criminal case- including ordering discovery. See State v. 
Montoya, 825 P.2d 676, 679 (Utah App. 1991) (once a trial court "imposes a 
valid sentence and final judgment is entered," it "loses subject matter 
jurisdiction over the case"). Once a court has determined that it lacks 
jurisdiction, it "retains only the authority to dismiss the action." Varian-
Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah App. 1989). 
The h·ial court therefore properly denied the discovery 1notion. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted on April 4, 2016. 
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ADDENDUM A 
Constitutional Provisions, Statutes 
and Rules 
Utah R. Crim. P. Rule Rule 22. Sentence, Judgment and Commitment 
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall set a 
time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two nor more than 45 days after 
the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the concurrence of the defendant, otherwise 
orders. Pending sentence, the court may commit the defendant or may continue or alter 
bail or recognizance. 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a 
statement and to present any information in mitigation of punishment, or to show any 
legal cause why sentence should not be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be 
given an opportunity to present any information material to the imposition of sentence. 
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's absence, defend-
ant may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence. If a defendant fails to appear for 
sentence, a warrant for defendant's arrest may be issued by the court. 
(c)(1) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall impose sen-
tence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include the plea or the ver-
dict, if any, and the sentence. Following imposition of sentence, the court shall advise the 
defendant of defendant's right to appeal and the time within which any appeal shall be 
filed. 
(c)(2) If the defendant is convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, as de-
fined in Utah Code Section 77-36-1, the court shall advise the defendant orally or in 
writing that, as a result of the conviction, it is unlawful for the defendant to possess, re-
ceive or transport any firearm or ammunition. The failure to advise does not render the 
plea invalid or form the basis for withdrawal of the plea 
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its commitment set-
ting forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to the jail or prison shall 
deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or prison and shall make the officer's 
return on the commitment and file it with the court. 
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, 
at any time. 
(f) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the court shall impose sentence in 
accordance with Title 77, Chapter 16a, Utah Code. If the court retains jurisdiction over a 
mentally ill offender committed to the Department of Human Services as provided by 
Utah Code Ann.§ 77-16a-202(1)(b), the court shall so specify in the sentencing order. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 30. Errors and Defects 
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the 
substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded. 
(b) Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors 
in the record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at 
any time and after such notice, if any, as the court may order. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60. Relief from Judgment or Order 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judg1nents, orders or other parts of the 
record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by 
the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after 
such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such 
mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, 
and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected with leave of the 
appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; 
fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a 
new h·ial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic 
or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; ( 4) the 
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or 
a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, 
or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective 
application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons 
(1), (2), or (3), not 1nore than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding 
was entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the 
finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the 
power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a 
judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the 
court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion 
as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action. 
Utah Code Annotated§ 78B-9-101. Title 
ca This chapter is known as the "Post-Conviction Remedies Act." 
Utah Code Annotated § 78B-9-102. Replacement of prior remedies 
(1) This chapter establishes the sole remedy for any person who challenges a conviction 
or sentence for a criminal offense and who has exhausted all other legal remedies, 
including a direct appeal except as provided in Subsection (2). This chapter replaces all 
prior remedies for review, including exh·aordinary or comn10n law writs. Proceedings 
under this chapter are civil and are governed by the rules of civil procedure. 
Procedural provisions for filing and commence1nent of a petition are found in Rule 
65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(2) This chapter does not apply to: 
(a) habeas corpus petitions that do not challenge a conviction or sentence for a 
criminal offense; 
(b) motions to correct a sentence pursuant to Rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure; or 
(c) actions taken by the Board of Pardons and Parole. 
Utah Code Annotated§ 78B-9-103. Applicability--Effect on petitions 
Except for the liinitation period established in Section 78B-9-107, this chapter applies 
only to post-conviction proceedings filed on or after July 1, 1996. 
Utah Code Annotated§ 78B-9-104. Grounds for relief--Retroactivity of rule 
(1) Unless precluded by Section 78B-9-106 or 78B-9-107, a person who has been 
convicted and sentenced for a criminal offense may file an action in the dish·ict court of 
original jurisdiction for post-conviction relief to vacate or modify the conviction or 
sentence upon the following grounds: 
(a) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed in violation of the 
United States Constitution or Utah Constitution; 
(b) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed under a statute that is 
in violation of the United States Constitution or Utah Constitution, or the conduct 
for which the petitioner was prosecuted is constitutionally protected; 
(c) the sentence was imposed or probation was revoked in violation of the 
controlling statutory provisions; 
( d) the petitioner had ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the United 
States Constitution or Utah Constitution; 
(e) newly discovered material evidence exists that requires the court to vacate the 
conviction or sentence, because: 
(i) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the evidence at the time 
of trial or sentencing or in time to include the evidence in any previously filed 
post-trial motion or post-conviction proceeding, and the evidence could not have 
been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence; 
(ii) the material evidence is not merely cumulative of evidence that was known; 
(iii) the material evidence is not merely impeachment evidence; and 
(iv) viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered material evidence 
demonstrates that no reasonable trier of fact could have found the petitioner 
guilty of the offense or subject to the sentence received; or 
(f) the petitioner can prove entitlement to relief under a rule announced by the 
United States Supreme Court, the Utah Supreme Court, or the Utah Court of 
Appeals after conviction and sentence became final on direct appeal, and that: 
(i) the rule was dictated by precedent existing at the time the petitioner's 
conviction or sentence became final; or 
(ii) the rule decriminalizes the conduct that comprises the elements of the crime 
for which the petitioner was convicted. 
(2) The court may not grant relief from a conviction or sentence unless the petitioner 
establishes that there would be a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome in 
light of the facts proved in the post-conviction proceeding, viewed with the evidence 
and facts introduced at trial or during sentencing. 
(3) The court may not grant relief from a conviction based on a claim that the petitioner 
is ilmocent of the crime for which convicted except as provided in Title 78B, Chapter 9, 
Part 3, Postconviction Testing of DNA, or Part 4, Postconviction Determination of 
Factual Innocence. Claims under Part 3, Postconviction Testing of DNA or Part 4, 
Postconviction Determination of Factual Innocence of this chapter may not be filed as 
part of a petition under this part, but shall be filed separately and in conformity with 
the provisions of Part 3, Postconviction Testing of DNA or Part 4, Postconviction 
Determination of Factual Innocence. 
~I 
Utah Code Annotated§ 78B-9-105. Burden of proof 
(1) The petitioner has the burden of pleading and proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence the facts necessary to entitle the petitioner to relief. The court may not grant 
relief without determining that the petitioner is entitled to relief under the provisions 
of this chapter and in light of the entire record, including the record from the criminal 
case under review. 
(2) The respondent has the burden of pleading any ground of preclusion under Section 
78B-9-106, but once a ground has been pled, the petitioner has the burden to disprove 
its existence by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Utah Code Annotated§ 78B-9-106. Preclusion of relief--Exception 
(1) A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground that: 
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion; 
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal; 
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal; 
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction relief or 
could have been, but was not, raised in a previous request for post-conviction relief; 
or 
(e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78B-9-107. 
(2) (a) The state may raise any of the procedural bars or time bar at any time, including 
during the state's appeal from an order granting post-conviction relief, unless the 
court determines that the state should have raised the time bar or procedural bar at 
an earlier time. 
(b) Any court may raise a procedural bar or time bar on its own motion, provided 
that it gives the parties notice and an opportunity to be heard. 
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(c), a person may be eligible for relief on a basis that 
the ground could have been but was not raised at h·ial or on appeal, if the failure to 
raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel. 
(4) This section authorizes a merits review only to the extent required to address the 
exception set forth in Subsection (3). 
Utah Code Annotated § 78B-9-107. Statute of limitations for postconviction relief 
(1) A petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed within one year after the 
cause of action has accrued. 
(2) For purposes of this section, the cause of action accrues on the latest of the following 
dates: 
(a) the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final judgment of 
conviction, if no appeal is taken; 
(b) the entry of the decision of the appellate court which has jurisdiction over the 
case, if an appeal is taken; 
(c) the last day for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the Utah Supreme Court 
or the United States Supreme Court, if no petition for writ of certiorari is filed; 
( d) the entry of the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari or the entry of the 
decision on the petition for certiorari review, if a petition for writ of certiorari is 
filed; 
(e) the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the petition is based; or 
(f) the date on which the new rule described in Subsection 78B-9-104(1)(f) is 
established. 
(3) The limitations period is tolled for any period during which the petitioner was 
prevented from filing a petition due to state action in violation of the United States 
Constitution, or due to physical or 1nental incapacity. The petitioner has the burden of 
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner is entitled to relief 
under this Subsection (3). 
(4) The statute of limitations is tolled during the pendency of the outcome of a petition 
asserting: 
(a) exoneration through DNA testing under Section 78B-9-303; or 
(b) factual innocence under Section 78B-9-401. • 
(5) Sections 77-19-8, 78B-2-104, and 78B-2-111 do not extend the limitations period 
established in this section. 
Utah Code Annotated § 78B-9-108. Effect of granting relief--N otice 
(1) If the court grants the petitioner's request for relief, it shall either: 
(a) modify the original conviction or sentence; or ~ 
(b) vacate the original conviction or sentence and order a new trial or sentencing 
proceeding as appropriate. 
(2) (a) If the petitioner is serving a felony sentence, the order shall be stayed for five 
days. Within the stay period, the respondent shall give written notice to the court 
and the petitioner that the respondent will pursue a new trial or sentencing 
proceedings, appeal the order, or take no action. 
(b) If the respondent fails to provide notice or gives notice at any time during the 
stay period that it intends to take no action, the court shall lift the stay and deliver 
the order to the custodian of the petitioner. 
(c) If the respondent gives notice of intent to appeal the court's decision, the stay 
provided for by Subsection (2)(a) shall remain in effect until the appeal concludes, 
including any petitions for rehearing or for discretionary review by a higher court. 
The court may lift the stay if the petitioner can make the showing required for a 
certificate of probable cause under Section 77-20-10 and URCP 27. 
( d) If the respondent gives notice that it intends to retry or resentence the petitioner, 
the trial court may order any supplementary orders as to arraignment, h·ial, 
sentencing, custody, bail, discharge, or other matters that may be necessary. 
Utah Code Annotated§ 78B-9-109. Appointment of pro bono counsel 
(1) If any portion of the petition is not summarily dismissed, the court may, upon the 
request of an indigent petitioner, appoint counsel on a pro bono basis to represent the 
petitioner in the post-conviction court or on post-conviction appeal. Counsel who 
represented the petitioner at trial or on the direct appeal may not be appointed to 
represent the petitioner under this section. 
(2) In determining whether to appoint counsel, the court shall consider the following 
factors: 
(a) whether the petition or the appeal contains factual allegations that will require 
an evidentiary hearing; and 
(b) whether the petition involves complicated issues of law or fact that require the 
assistance of counsel for proper adjudication. 
(3) An allegation that counsel appointed under this section was ineffective cannot be 
the basis for relief in any subsequent post-conviction petition. 
Utah Code Annotated§ 78B-9-110. Appeal--Jurisdiction 
Any party may appeal from the trial court's final judgment on a petition for 
~ post-conviction relief to the appellate court having jurisdiction pursuant to Section 
78A-3-102 or 78A-4-103. 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded on August 25, 2008) 
3 MR. RICH: Could we turn to the Dennis Wynn matter? 
4 THE COURT: Yes. I' 11 call that case. Counsel, I think 
5 I remembered what the offer from the State was. You mentioned it 
r 
0 was two 2 nd Degree Felonie~, two 3 rd DE!gree rt'"'!lonies; is that 
7 correct? 
8 MR. RICH: That's correct. We had drafted that as 
9 Counts I, II, V and VII. The remaining counts will be dismissed. 
10 THE COURT: Okay. 
11 MR. RICH: Stipulation for sentencing as we previously 
12 discussed. 
13 THE COURT: Right. 
14 MR. RICH: I've been over an affidavit, believe that he 
15 knows and understands the rights that he's waiving. 
16 THE COURT: Now Mr. Rich, the sentencing was to be 
17 imposed today, is that --
18 MR. RICH: That's what we anticipate is that the Court 
19 will impose sentencing concurrent with the federal sentence which 
20 he's serving on October 6th , and not issue a commitment on that 
21 and leave open the issue of restitution until the date of that 
22 surrender. We'll be able to stipulate on the figure, 
23 acknowledging that he has herewith today tendered $100,000 
24 towards restitution. 
25 THE COURT: In certified funds? 
-3-
1 MR. GUNNARSON: Yes, your Honor, I see that. 
2 THE COURT: Okay. You're Mr. Dennis Wynn? 
3 MR. WYNN: Yes. 
4 THE COURT: Mr. Wynn, you've -- I know Mr. Rich is very 
5 thorough, so you've covered all this with him? You understand 
6 what you're pleading guilty to? 
7 MR. WYNN: I do. 
8 THE COURT: You've agreed to it? 
9 MR. WYNN: I have. 
10 THE COURT: I indicated to your attorney and the State's 
11 attorney that I would accept their sentencing recommendations, so 
12 you'll be given a sentence of two counts -- on two of the counts 
13 1 to 15 years in prison to run concurrently and two other counts 
14 zero to five years in prison, all counts to run concurrently and 
15 to run concurrent with the federal time. I've agreed not to 
16 issue a commitment until you're scheduled to report on your 
17 federal commitment. 
18 I'll also order that you pay full and complete 
19 restitution in an amount of at least $100,000, but probably as 
20 your attorney, I think in his words, were many times more than 
21 that, but the two of you will agree on a figure that will be 
22 presented at the time you surrender. Is that what you 
23 understand? 
24 MR. WYNN: Yes, sir. 



























rights you're giving up, all the sentencing nuances, possible 
consecutive sentences, even though I've indicated I'll follow the 
recommendation. You understand all of that? 
MR. WYNN: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: You agree that you're guilty of these 
ch,3r.gP.s? 
MR. WYNN: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: If you're sentenced today, Mr. Wynn, as your 
attorney has requested, you lose the right to ask me to let you 
withdraw the guilty plea. The deadline for making a motion to 
withdraw the guilty plea is the date of sentencing. Since that 
day is today, then that right is gone as far as you're concerned. 
Do you understand that? 
MR. WYNN: I do. 
THE COURT: The form that Mr. Rich has probably prepared 
himself provided you, did you read it, Mr. Wynn? 
MR. WYNN: I have, sir. 
THE COURT: Do you agree to give up all of those rights? 
MR. WYNN: I do. 
THE COURT: The State's approved it as well? 
MR. GUNNARSON: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: I'll approve it and note that Mr. Wynn has 
signed it. To the charges in Counts I and II, securities fraud, 
a 2 nd Degree Felony, how do you plead, guilty or not guilty? 



























THE COURT: To the charges in Counts V and VII, 
securities -- let's see, one Count Vis securities fraud, a 3 rd 
Degree Felony, Count VII, theft. I guess that's been amended to 
a 3~ Degree Felony. It's shown as --
MR. GUNNARSON: It has been amended (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Okuy, a 3 rd Degree Felony. How do you plead 
to those two charges? 
MR. GUNNARSON: Guilty. 
THE COURT: Guilty. I'll accept the guilty pleas. 
Anything else, Counsel? 
MR. RICH: Nothing further. 
THE COURT: I'll impose the sentences we agreed to, two 
1 to 15s to run concurrent, two zero to fives to run concurrent, 
all sentences to run concurrent with each other on the federal 
sentence. I'll order that full and complete restitution be paid 
and the amount -- stipulated amount submitted by October Gth ? 
MR. RICH: That's correct. 
THE COURT: Mr. Wynn will report to federal authorities 
on that date also to surrender; is that correct? 
MR. RICH: That's correct. Thank you. 
MR. GUNNARSON: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Let us give Mr. Wynn a copy of his sentence 
before he leaves, though. Mr. Rich, we can give that to you. 
MR. RICH: That's correct. 
{Hearing concluded} 
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sentencing. Plaintiff was represented by E. Neal Gunnarson, 
Assistant Attorney General, defendant was present and represented 
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October 6, 2008, the date on which the defendant is to report to 
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\l\,\ 
Fll~D DISTRICT COURT 
Thrrd Judicial Dtstrict 
OCT 2·1-2008 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
By _____ ~::-----
After reviewing all pleadings in this matter, and ffftf•er&~e 
consideration, the Court hereby enters the following: 
PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-38a-202 AND§ 77-38a-401, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1) The defendant is ordered to pay restitution in this case 
in the total amount of $782,068.63 to those victims identified on 
Exhibit "A" attached hereto. 
2) The defendant is hereby ordered to make monthly 
payments toward restitution in an amount to be determined between 
the parties once the defendant has been released from 
incarceration. Payments shall be made payable through the Office 
of the Utah Attorney General, Financial Crimes Prosecution Unit, 
5272 South College Drive, Suite 200, Murray, Utah 84123, for 
disbursement to the victims in this case. 
DATED this 2--;_ day of __ 6_<_~-------' 2008. 
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ROBIN REESE 
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2008, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing "Order of 
Restitution" to be served by the method(s) indicated below, upon 
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Bradley P. Rich, Esq. 
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ 
175 East 400 South, Suite #400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
--·~\::- U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Electronically recorded on May 2, 2013) 
HEARING OFFICER: We're going to go ahead and get 
-2-
4 started. Today is the time and place set for a re-hearing for a 
5 Dennis Terry Wynn, offender No. 50251. Is that you? 
6 
7 
MR. WYNN: That's correct. 
HEARING OFFICER: All right. Welcome. My name is Jan 
8 Nicol. I'm hearing officer with the parole board, and I'll be 
9 conducting the proceedings today. Did you receive at least seven 




MR. WYNN: I did. 
HEARING OFFICER: Did you receive a blue disclosure 





HEARING OFFICER: Have you had a chance to read the 
materials given to you? 
MR. WYNN: I have. 
HEARING OFFICER: I am going to take sworn testimony 
19 from you today, so I do need to place you under oath. If I can 
20 get you to raise your right hand, please. Do you swear and 
21 affirm the information you're about to give is the truth, the 
22 whole truth and nothing but the truth? 
23 
24 
MR. WYNN: I do. 
HEARING OFFICER: Thank you. All right. I would like 




1 It looks like members of your family are here, Amy and David 
2 Carr, and it looks like Heather Fabian and Andrea --
3 
4 
MR. WYNN: Taunauta. 
HEARING OFFICER: I can't say it, but welcome. We also 
5 have on behalf of the victims, we have Ryan Stephenson. It looks 
6 like you're here and you'd like to speak, and we will allow you 
7 an opportunity to do so, probably somewhere midway through the 
8 hearing. 
9 All right. Mr. Wynn, as you have reviewed the blue 
10 disclosure documents, is there any corrections or errors you want 







MR. WYNN: No. 
HEARING OFFICER: So the information appears to be 
correct to you? 
MR. WYNN: Yes. 
HEARING OFFICER: Okay. Let me just kind of briefly 
explain what we're going to do. You already had what we'd 
18 consider an original hearing, but it was held in absentia because 







this hearing, it is a re-hearing, but we're going to somewhat 
treat it like an original hearing just because you were absent at 
the last one. 
We're going to go over obviously why you're in prison. 
We'll discuss some of your history. I have some questions for 
you. It's also an opportunity for you to ask questions or made 
-4-
1 additional statements or provide the board additional information 
2 you want them to consider. At the conclusion of this hearing I 
3 will be giving you a recommendation that I will be forwarding to 
4 the board. I don't make any of the decisions. Those are left to 
5 the five members of the board who will make a decision based on 
6 majority vote. There are five of them, so at least three of them 
7 have to agree. Usually you'll receive a decision within the next 





MR. WYNN: Okay. 
HEARING OFFICER: Okay. Do you have any questions? 
MR. WYNN: No. 
HEARING OFFICER: Okay. The records indicate that 
13 you're here on one case. It's a 2006 case ending in 6774. It's 
14 security fraud, a 2nd Degree Felony, two counts, and security 
15 frauds, 3rd Degree Felony, two counts. 
16 MR. WYNN: Correct. 
17 HEARING OFFICER: Your expiration date is August 24~, 
18 2023. Okay. Why don't you just kind of tell me in your own 
19 words I will read a summary of the information, but why don't 






MR. WYNN: How far do you want me to 90 back to the 
federal stuff? Do you want me to go just to the state stuff? 
HEARING OFFICER: I just want you to summarize what you 
did. 




1 I -- we were privately funded, and it was a good business plan. 
2 I didn't pay close attention to how it was funded, and at the end 
3 of 12 years it failed. 
4 I was in some disbelief about it failing and trying to 
5 keep it up, and I think I was in denial. I know I was in denial. 
6 There was a lot of pride trying to -- I had built this company. 
7 From there I moved forward trying to do some of the same things. 
8 I compartmentalized, and there was some denial. I tried to do 
9 car things with different people. I did some real estate things 
10 with different people that we had done in the company, and I over 
11 projected and it didn't work. I tried to keep things up that 




HEARING OFFICER: Are you finished? 
MR. WYNN: Uh-huh. 
HEARING OFFICER: Okay. Well, I've summarized and the 
16 offense was about four pages long, single spaced, so this is 
17 really a summary of that. Between June 2003 and October 2005 you 
18 offered or sold investments to at least six investors in the 
19 State of Utah and collected $184,526. Investors were either 
20 introduced to you through a common acquaintance, while others had 
21 known you for several years. 




told them their money would be used either to flip vehicles or 
real property. You claimed that through this vehicle program 





1 vehicles to purchasers with poor credit. You told investors you 
2 would arrange financing for purchasers at a fairly high interest 
3 rate and would split the interest with the investors. Some 




You also stated you could facilitate an investment 
similar to the vehicle program with real property. You said 
8 you would find foreclosed real property to purchase and sell 
9 the property for a profit. You claimed the profits would be 
10 continually reinvested in additional real property. You gave 
11 some investors an unsecured promissory note while other investors 
12 entered into verbal investment contracts with you. 
13 Between November 2004 and June 2005 you offered to 
14 purchase automobiles for three individuals in the State of Utah 
15 and collected $62,000. You stated you could purchase automobiles 
'16 from auctions and wholesale buyers through your Arizona Cyber 
17 Auto dealership. 
18 Throughout your various dealings you never purchased 
19 vehicles or the real estate promised, and used the money for 
20 various business expenses, family members, family living 
21 expenses, cash and personal purchases. You failed to disclose a 
22 prior bankruptcy, $2 million in outstanding civil judgments, a 
23 tax lien filed in Arizona for 163,000, the loss of your real 
24 estate license and other delinquencies. 





1 witness tampering. You contacted at least two employees during 
2 the investigation and basically told them to keep their mouth 
3 shut. You even threatened to implicate one of them in the 
4 charges. Does that sound accurate? 
5 MR. WYNN: The witness tampering part, I was not aware 
6 that I was under investigation at that point in time, and they 
7 were employees, so I -- I had conversation with them, that's 
8 true, but I was not aware of investigation going on at that point 
9 in time. 
10 HEARING OFFICER: But you still wanted them to keep 
11 their mouth shut? 
12 
13 
MR. WYNN: Yeah. 
HEARING OFFICER: Okay. So at this point I have 
14 restitution is owed in the amount of $782,068.63. It says 
15 $100,000 of this has been paid, and there's a balance of 
16 $682,068; is that correct? 
17 MR. WYNN: I don't -- I haven't seen those figures, so 
18 it sounds correct. 
19 
20 
HEARING OFFICER: Well, they were in the blue packet. 
MR. WYNN: They're not in the blue packet that I have. 
21 They may have been in the original blue packet, but that original 
22 blue packet was sent --
23 HEARING OFFICER: Have you paid more than $100,000? 
24 
25 
MR. WYNN: Not that I'm aware of. 








MR. WYNN: Yes. 
HEARING OFFICER: Okay. So as I look over the victims, 
3 it looks there were 20 separate victims with losses ranging from 
4 7,000 to $107,000 each. 
5 MR. WYNN: And I don't have the -- I don't have that in 
6 my blue packet, so 
7 HEARING OFFICER: Well, I can't give you the victim's 
8 addresses for mailing purposes. Okay. So any of that 
9 information that you want to add upon, or does that pretty 
10 well sum it up? ~ 
11 MR. WYNN: I think that sums it up. 
12 HEARING OFFICER: Okay. So kind of -- how did you go 
13 about -- because it sounds like many of these people were 
14 friends. 
15 MR. WYNN: I worked for a financial planning company 
16 that a lot of those people were sent to me. I also had a friend 
17 who was a builder that I had some association with, and he had 
18 some -- he and I had an association, and he led me to some of 
19 that. He convinced me to take some of my past contracts and 
2 0 assign them to people. 
21 So it had to do with -- it had to do with -- it had to 
22 do with the prior business dealings that I had. We had created 
23 contracts. We had built a business over a long period of time. 
24 We were buying cars for bad credit people, so it was at the end 
25 of all of that coming apart that this all took place. 
-9-
1 HEARING OFFICER: t guess -- how did you justify it 
2 to yourself at the end of each day when you weren't really 
i 3 delivering any product? 
~ 
4 MR. WYNN: Well, we actually still had contracts at 
5 that point in time. We had cash flow. I had two separate 
6 corporations, one in Utah, one in Arizona. We were still a 
7 dealer. You know, I -- pride and denial set in. There was 
8 I -- you know, some disbelief that I couldn't do what I had been 
9 able to do in the past. I had had a large organization and 
10 things fell apart. 
11 I -- you know, I believed I could do the things that I 
12 had promised to do, or I had never made the promises to do them. 
13 Even though I wasn't able to perform, you know, part of that was 
14 I had compartmentalized, you know. I believed -- I believed in 
15 what I was doing. I had bought cars. I had done the things that 
16 I promised these people that I had done. My company had done 
17 them. I -- it wasn't something that I, you know, hadn't done 
18 before. 
19 HEARING OFFICER: Okay, because one -- when one looks at 
20 it, it almost appears like you were recruiting a victim to help 
21 pay for your next paycheck. I mean that's kind of how it looks, 
22 because basically you recruit a victim, their money went into 
23 your account, you spent it all because your account was in the 
24 hole when you got it, usually. You'd spend it all, and then -- I· 
25 mean it was obvious you weren't going to use the victim's money 
-10-
1 to buy anything because the money was spent. 
2 MR. WYNN: We had -- you know, we still had cash flow 
3 coming in. We still had an amount of cash flow coming in. It 
4 I know that's how it appears. That's -- that's -- that was not 
5 my intent. I know that's how it appears, and that's how it ended 
6 up being. 
7 You know, I've looked at it long and hard. I've spent 
8 55 months lookin~ at and wondering about it and trying to figure 
9 it out. I was in denial that I could make things happen that 
10 weren't going to hap -- that wasn't going to happen, but they 
11 were things that I literally had done and completed and done in 
12 the past. It was things that my business had done that were 
13 you know, we went to the auction, we bought cars, we had bad 
14 credit people, we did all of those things. 
15 So part of it was just a sense of everything falling 
11 
16 apart at that point in time in my life. There were lots of --
17 the business had fallen apart. I was left with all of the 
18 I was literally left with all of the weight of taking care of 
19 everything, a business that I was under a lease in Arizona, 
20 employees -- I had over 80 employees at one point in time, and 
21 all of the equipment, all of the files and all 6f the things to 
22 take care of, and I was just trying to hold up too many pieces 
23 all at the same time. ~ 
24 HEARING OFFICER: Yeah, but it seems that you were 








1 MR. WYNN: Well, I realize that's how it appears, and 
2 that's what ended up happening. 
3 HEARING OFFICER: Were you honest with any of these 
4 people at any point in their transactions with them? 
5 MR. WYNN: I felt like I was honest with them in the 
6 transactions and you know, it ended up I couldn't do what I 
7 said I could do. 
8 HEARING OFFICER: How are you proposing you're going to 
9 pay back this restitution, because not only do you have the 
10 restitution on the state case, but there's also the restitution 
11 on the federal case. 
12 MR. WYNN: I've spent, you know, a good time of time in 
13 the last 55 months really reviewing and looking at not only my 
14 weaknesses but my strengths. In 1998 I did live talk radio 
15 shows, I created an infomercial, I have a car program that I 
16 created that's a good car program. It was well ahead of its 
17 time. i 1 ve worked on business plans in preparation to put it on 
18 the internet and to do some positive things with it. I have --
19 I've not only looked at what I've done, but I've looked at what I 
20 could do to repay these people in the last 55 months, and I've 
21 worked hard at it. 
22 HEARING OFFICER: Okay. So you don't have a specific 
23 plan in mind? 
24 MR. WYNN: I plan on using a car program that I created 





1 I have a program 
2 HEARING OFFICER: Okay. Is that going to involve 
3 trading, selling, leasing vehicles? 
4 MR. WYNN: It's basically information and it's on the 
5 internet. 
6 HEARING OFFICER: Okay, but what I asked you is is that 
7 going to involve trading, selling or leasing? 
8 MR. WYNN: From my standpoint? No. 
9 HEARING OFFICER: Uh-huh, because I don't think it's 
10 going to be allowed. 
11 MR. WYNN: From my standpoint, no. It's going to be 
12 information that's given to people. 
13 HEARING OFFICER: Okay. How are you going to profit off 
14 of information? 
15 MR. WYNN: From -- well, there will be dealers that are 
16 involved that will have to do transactions, but that will be away 
17 from me. 
18 HEARING OFFICER: I think anytime that you have any 
19 contact with any kind of fiduciary type funds, there's going to 
20 be question about what you' re doing. 
21 MR. WYNN: My information won't be fiduciary funds. 
22 HEARING OFFICER: So you're not going to be collecting 
23 any funds at all? 
24 
25 
MR. WYNN: Payment for information. 




1 you are to get out at some point and be able to pay restitution, 
2 what is a reasonable amount that you're going to be able to pay 
3 in a given month? 
4 MR. WYNN: I don't know. I don't know the answer to 
5 that right now, because I -- like I said, I've been out of the 
6 market for a long period of time. Technology has changed things 
7 a great deal. I'm going to have to take a look at where things 
8 are at this point in time. 
9 HEARING OFFICER: Did you liquidate all your assets to 
10 pay your restitution? 
11 
12 
MR. WYNN: I've liquidated -- everything I have is gone. 
HEARING OFFICER: Okay. Let's take a break right here 
13 and we' 11 allow Mr. Stephenson to speak. 
14 
15 
MR. STEPHENSON: Thank you for the opportunity. 
HEARING OFFICER: I do have to place you under oath 
16 before we start. 
17 
18 
MR. STEPHENSON: Okay. 
HEARING OFFICER: So if I can just get you to state your 
19 ful 1 name on the record for me, please. 
20 
21 
MR. STEPHENSON: Ryan Wesley Stephenson. 
HEARING OFFICER: Thank you. Do you swear to tell the 
22 truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth? 
23 
24 
25 Go ahead. 
MR. STEPHENSON: I do. 
HEARING OFFICER: Thank you. Okay. The time is yours. 
,. 
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1 MR. STEPHENSON: Thank you for the opportunity to be 
2 here. I wrote a letter. I'm going to read it. 
3 
4 
HEARING OFFICER: Okay. 
MR. STEPHENSON: Before I do, I have three words for 
5 you, Dennis. We forgive you, and I hope that sinks deep. It's 
6 hard to do, but we forgive you, and I want your family to know 




few thoughts. This is hard for me to be here. 
HEARING OFFICER: Okay. 
MR. STEPHENSON: As Dennis and I unloaded bags of rock 
11 salt out of the BMW into our empty carless garage, my 3-year-old 
12 son stood on the landing in front of our home to that same 









think Dennis will either. He was 4. uDennis, you're a liar." 
I started to apologize and correct him, when Dennis 
replied, "It's okay." Those words were so true. My son had the 
courage to say ·what I couldn't. Today it's our turn. I say it 
now with no hesitation. I owe it to my family. Dennis, you were 
a liar. You were a thief. You nearly destroyed what we had 
worked so hard for, but we came out victors. 
Dennis has lied to us the day he came here -- until the 
22 day he came here. He has never told us the truth as to what he 
23 did with our money. Even today, he hasn't told that truth. He 
24 led us this way and that way, always providing a wee bit of hope. 
25 Excuse after excuse rolled from his tongue. It led us down a 









1 path of false hope and lost dreams. He was a thief of our money, 
2 a thief of our opportunity and most of all a thief of our time. 
3 These will never be turned. Washington Irving, a great American 
4 author said this: A sharp tongue is the only edge tool that 
5 grows keener with constant use. Indeed, we were witness to this 
6 very truth. 
7 Days after the sickening realization set in, I received 
8 a blessing from my church leaders who counseled us to move 
9 forward. We have. Blessings have come our way. Opportunity and 
10 job growth have been ours. Burdens have been lightened as we've 
11 t~ied to move forward and forget this tragedy, yet two things 
12 have prevented a complete separation from our experience. The 
13 false hope of ever receiving what was once ours, and our total 
14 forgiveness of Dennis. We know that our devil -- our debt will 
15 never ?e paid back. The dollar value of Dennis's restitution is 
16 too great. If we continue to have hope in something we know will 
17 never come to pass will only rob us of more time. 
18 Today Peggy and I offer our complete forgiveness to you, 
19 Dennis. We hold no malice. Our hope has turned to something 
20 different, something more worthwhile, something brighter. It 
21 does not include you. Our hope for you is to heal. Our children 
22 have remembered you in their prayers, praying that you will 
23 become someone of character. 
24 We ask the justice system to erase from Dennis's 




1 do not want a monetary settlement. We have been strained by the 
2 spirit long enough, and now consider ourselves and Dennis free 
3 from this debt. We were once Peter. We don't want to become 
4 Paul. I speak of an age old adage of which we are all familiar. 
5 Peggy and I want no part of restitution if it means theft from 
6 another to fill our pockets with that which is the root of all 
7 evil. 
8 Our fear is that Dennis will begin where he left off. 
9 This comes from the lie we continued to hear to the time of 
10 his incarceration. There is a continued inability to accept 
11 responsibility for his actions which lead one to believe he's yet 
12 to change his behavior. The two words which could soften any 
13 heart, those that show true sorrow were never spoken. Those two 
14 words were I'm sorry. I'm sorry were those two words which never 




As Peggy and I address the board of pardons, we are 
advocates for one to have a second chance. We do stand and 
19 plead for Dennis's release, yet do not stand and plead for his 
20 continued incarceration, This is a burden that you must carry. 
21 It is a decision that you must make and we do not envy you. 
22 If it is decided that Dennis is no longer a threat of 
23 committing this crime toward any other, then we have a specific 
24 responsibility to accept this decision. If the feelings are to 
25 the contrary and Dennis continues to be incarcerated, we will 
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1 also support the board's decision. There will be no celebration 
2 on our part either way. We remember your family in our prayers. 
3 We ask the Lord's blessings to be upon all of you in this 
4 difficult time. 
5 After I wrote this letter, my wife and I had an 
6 opportunity to get away for a couple of days and had these 
7 feelings that if Dennis can pay back to everybody else but us, 
8 it serves no purpose for him to continue to be incarcerated in a 
9 legal way. If he can pay it back in a legal way. If the pattern 
10 continues, then we've failed the system. That's the board's 
11 decision, and we support you whichever way we go. Once again, 
12 Dennis, we forgive you. Thank you. 
13 HEARING OFFICER: Would you mind if the bailiff made a 
14 copy of your testimony? Would that be okay? 
15 MR. STEPHENSON: That would be fine. Some of it is 
16 written, some of it is not. 
17 HEARING OFFICER: That's okay. I appreciate it. Thank 
18 you.· Mr. Wynn, do you have any comments? 
19 MR. WYNN: I'd like to tell Mr. Stephenson I'm sorry. 
20 I've -- you know, I've spent 55 months looking at this scenario 
21 and working hard at correcting thought processes, and doing all 
22 that I could to change who I am. I basically have done that 
23 through finding myself spiritually, working hard at accepting 
24 responsibility and moving forward so that I could benefit my 
25 family and benefit those that I've hurt. 
I 
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1 There isn't a day that goes by that I don't and haven't 
2 prayed for not only the victims, but that I haven't worked hard 
3 at making changes in my own life by studying and looking at, 
4 praying, working at, doing all that I could to make sure that I 
5 understood where I was at and why the decisions that I made were 
6 made, how they affected people. 
7 HEARING OFFICER: How much impact do you think it really 
8 has if you say sorry after he basically asked for -- I mean 
9 basically says you haven't. 
10 
11 
MR. WYNN: I don't know what else to do. I mean I --
HEARING OFFICER: Well, and you may be indeed sorry, but 
12 sometimes apologies, if they don't come on their own accord, 
13 they're kind of empty. 
14 
15 
MR. WYNN: I understand that. 
HEARING OFFICER: You know, he has the analogy that I 
16 actually wrote on my paper, because it is kind of a Peter and 
17 Paul type thing. I mean you were robbing from Peter to pay Paul. 
18 Some victims got paid from each other, and it just kind of went 




I don't know. You know, I don't think you certainly --
like most people who commit fraud have the ability to pay for 
it, okay. There's a couple of types of scenarios that go into 
23 play. There's those who don't have the ability to pay for it or 
24 those that have the ability and don't want to pay for it, so I 
25 don't know where you fall in that, but you owe a lot of money, 
~I 
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1 I mean the federal system is $15 million. So when he 
2 comments that he doesn't think he's going to get his money back, 
3 I mean he's absolutely right. Short of some type of miracle or 
4 somebody else getting ripped off, I mean if you have some idea of 
5 how you think that's going to get paid, you certainly feel free 
6 to share it, but the fraud cases I've dealt with over the years, 
7 you just ·don't see no return of $15 million. So I guess I'd like 
8 to know, where did you spend it? 
9 MR. WYNN: The $15 million is first of all, not an 
10 accurate figure, but --
11 HEARING OFFICER: Okay. Well, let's just stay with the 
12 state money. Where did you spend it? Where did you spend 
13 $184,000? 
14 MR. WYNN: I -- you know, it's -- I don't know. 
15 know at this point in time. I accept responsibility, but 
16 know, I don't know. I don't have an accounting for it in 




18 HEARING OFFICER: Okay. What would you like to tell the 
19 board today, if anything. 
20 MR. WYNN: That I'm -- you know what, that I'm not the 
21 same person that I was 55 months ago, that I've spent a lot of 
22 time contemplating and looking at, asking my Heavenly Father for 
23 forgiveness, studying, trying to prepare, look at a way that I 
24 could take care of my obligations and responsibility, but 




I've spent a lot of time reading, I've spent a lot of 
time studying, I've spent a lot of time preparing, I've spent a 






change my own heart and to be a different person than I was when 
I came in. I was angry and prideful. I created a lot of 
problems when I came in -- before I came in. I'm not the same 
person today. 
HEARING OFFICER: Okay. How do you think that's going 
9 to change in terms if you were to be out? How are you going to 
10 change? ~ 
11 
12 
MR. WYNN: How am I going to change? 
HEARING OFFICER: Yeah. What is it that we're going to 
13 see in outward form? 
14 MR. WYNN: I'm a different person today. I think 
15 different. I'm concerned about the people that I've hurt. I'm 
16 trying to do the right things every day. I don't know what else 
17 to do. 
18 HEARING OFFICER: All right. This case, as I previously 
19 mentioned, carries an expiration date of 2023. The guideline on 
20 the case -- now a guideline, just so everybody is aware what a 
21 guideline is, it's just kind of a general mark the board uses to 
22 decide when to consider releasing somebody. Yours is March of 
23 2010. So that's already come and gone. 
24 I don't know that it probably even applies in the case 
25 because the board will go above it or below it depending on 
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1 aggravating or mitigating circumstances, and there's certainly a 
2 lot of aggravating circumstances. One, just the amount of money 
3 by itself is aggravating, and the number of victims, and the fact 
4 that there's, you know, other similar type activities going on. 
5 So it has already exceeded the guidelines, and I'm 
6 guessing it's going to exceed the guidelines by more. I'm sure 
7 at some point the board is probably going to extend you a parole 
8 with an expectation that you start to pay back some of this, but 
9 we're also very realistic in terms of what, you know, the victims 
10 are going to get in the end. Would we like them to be whole? 
11 Yes, we would. Short of you I guess pulling, you know, a rabbit 
12 out of a hat some offshore account, I don't think they're going 
13 to get paid. So -- but I do expect you to do some more time, 
14 okay. 
15 I personally haven't come to a recommendation, but my 
16 guess is, you know, the board may be considering something 
... 
17 several years down the road. At such time, if they do order a 
. . : 
18 parole, it's going to have conditions that state specifically 
19 you're not to deal with fiduciary funds. It may even be as 
20 specific to say you're not to be dealing in automobiles, because 
21 that's where a lot of this deception happened. Certainly what we 
22 don't want you to do is to leave and go get a job doing the same 
23 thing that you were doing to get you into this to begin with. 
24 But we also don't want to incapacitate you to the point where you 
25 can't work, either. So any comments? 
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1 MR. WYNN: I would ask the board to take into 
2 consideration the amount of time that I've spent and now more 
3 time is going to make any effect on -- positive effect on me, how 
II 4 it impacts my family and how it also impacts the victims because 
5 of, you know, the inability to even work to pay or help them at 
6 all. 
7 HEARING OFFICER: Let's just hypothetically, let's just 
8 say you pay $100 a month, okay? I want you to kind of visualize 
9 yourself as a victim, because we have to divide it amongst the 
10 victims. Just for easy calculation purposes, let's say there's 
: 11 10 victims, and you pay $100 a month. How would you feel as a 
12 victim if you got a $10 check in the mail each month? 
13 MR. WYNN: I guess it's better than nothing at this 
14 point in time. 
\I 
15 HEARING OFFICER: And that's your comment, okay, because 
16 I deal with victims on a regular basis, and I'm sorry, it's kind 
17 of insult for a victim to get $10 in the mail. It may be an 
18 effort on your behalf, but not only is it very insignificant, but 
19 it's also a reminder every single month when you get the $10 
20 check of what happened to you. It -- you know, it can make 
21 people very bitter. 
22 So as a victim, sometimes getting $10 in the mail is not 
23 worth it. Sometimes it's far more worth it just to have you sit 
24 there. Those are the things we look at and we have to weigh at 






1 of what we kind of think about. Do we want restitution paid? 
2 It's actually our No. 1 priority, but we also have to think about 
3 is it really going to happen, and you know, I've had a victim get 
4 a dollar check in the mail, okay. That's what happens with fraud 
5 (inaudible) because there's no much restitution, there are so 
6 many victims by the time you disburse it. 
7 So it -- oftentimes you end up getting a very insulted 
8 victim, and I don't blame them, because if I had to remember it 
9 every month when I got that little check in the mail, that would 
10 be frustrating. I can understand where Mr. Stephenson is coming 
11 from. Sometimes you just have to accept that you are not going 
12 to get it because then you can you can go on with life, and it 
13 doesn't become the burden that bears you down. 
14 So anyway, that's -- those are the things that the 
15 board takes into consideration. We understand you've spent a 
16 significant time in federal custody, but I'm going to tell you, 
17 had you spent the entire time here, I don't know that you'd be 
18 getting out, because we're considering it. This runs concurrent 
19 to your federal time. So those are things the board will take 
20 into consideration, but I'm just going to tell you, you may need 
21 to prepare to be spending some more time. What that is, I don't 
22 know, okay? If you have anything further, I'll let you comment. 
23 Otherwise, we'll close the proceedings. 
24 
25 
MR. WYNN: I don't have anything further. 







· 1 in• a few weeks, then. Thank you. 
2 (Hearing concluded) 
